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I.

Introduction

"Shell companies," summarily defined as companies devoid of physical or
human substance,' continue to regularly appear at the center of international
scandals. The Panama Papers stand out as the most memorable of the
"Papers" and "Leaks" series that made media headlines.2 To most
international practitioners of corporate finance and transactions, however,
these revelations did not come as a surprise, as shell companies have been at
the center of corporate and tax planning for decades. A few alarm bells were
rung by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in the early 2000s 3 in
connection with the use of these structures for tax evasion and money
laundering, but the critique took on a new dimension after the 2008 financial
crisis and seems now to have become the prevailing orthodoxy in policymaking circles. In 2015, for example, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)'s annual World Investment Report
* Lecturer-in-law, Columbia Law School, Senior research fellow, Columbia Center for
Global Legal Transformation, practicing corporate and commercial lawyer. The research for
this article was supported by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and Private
International Law in Hamburg, to which the author expressed her thanks. She also thanks the
organizers and participants of a 2018 workshop at SOAS University of London on the topic
"Sovereignty and Offshoring," at which a prior version of this paper was presented, and in
particular Kristin Surak of SOAS and Tonya Putnam of Columbia University. All errors are her
own.
1. On this definition of "shell companies," see infra Section II. Generally, in this article, the
terms "company" and "corporation" will be used interchangeably, as will "company law" and

"corporate law."
2. The most recent leaks, at the time of writing, were the 2017 Malta Files and Football

Leaks (both produced by the European Investigative Collaborations, a consortium of
journalists) as well as the November 2017 Paradise Papers and 2018 West Africa Leaks
produced by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (who were also at the

origin of the 2013 Offshore Leaks, 2014 LuxLeaks, 2015 Swiss Leaks and 2016 Panama Papers).
See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 545 58 (2018) (for a
summary of data leaks up until the Panama Papers).
3. FIN.

ACTION TASK FORCE,

FATF 40

RECOMMENDATIONS

(2003); FIN. ACTION TASK
4 (2014); FIN. ACTION

FORCE, GUIDANCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUSTS AND COMPANY
SERVICE PROVIDERS

(2006); ORG.

FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [HEREINAFTER

BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL: USING

OECD],

CORPORATE ENTITIES FOR ILLICIT PURPOSES

(2001).

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

3

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
328

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 52, NO.2

dedicated its policy chapter to the "pervasive" and "outsized" use of offshore
investment hubs through the use of "letterbox companies" by multinational
corporations and the resulting decline in tax revenues received by developing
countries. 4 The following year, its policy chapter analyzed the "blurring" of
investor nationality from multiple tiers of corporate ownership, transit
investment through third countries, round-tripping and "mailbox
companies," 5 concluding that overly-complex corporate structuring made it
increasingly difficult for governments to devise and implement effective
policies on foreign investment. Even within a legal system like Britaintraditionally very deferent to private ordering in general-a leading scholar
wrote:
[T]here is a sense, which does not really go away, that as corporate
structuring has become more and more focused on the maximization of
assets and profits, which is in turn brought about by managing to make
liabilities, whether personal, trade or fiscal, somehow vanish, the
common law has been rather too ready to shrug its shoulders.6
Much of this corporate structuring, of course, relies on the use of shell
companies registered in a small number of well-known hub jurisdictions.
The response at present has been to accelerate intergovernmental measures
that were already under way to combat tax evasion and money-laundering.7
These measures involve creating new stores of information through two
types of channels: first, exchange of financial account information across
borders,s and second, domestic registries of beneficial owners of companies. 9
It will be a few years before the empirical effects of these new measures can
be evaluated, but it already seems they suffer from a number of inherent
weaknesses. They are, first of all, geographically incomplete, due to the
4. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming
InternationalInvestment Governance, at 189 90, 200, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/WJR/2015 (2015).
5. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2016: Investor
Nationality: Policy Changes, at 144, 160, 185 87, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2016 (2016)
("[C]omplex ownership of investment projects or foreign participated companies i.e. multiple
cross-border ownership links to the ultimate owner through intermediate entities... at a
minimum . . . make the application of rules and regulations on foreign ownership more
challenging."). A particularly salient problem is "how to avoid investors using artificial entities
(mailbox companies) .. .to unduly gain access to treaty benefits." UNCTAD refers to this as
the "multilateralizing effect" of ownership complexity.

6.

ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, T 10.32 (2014).
7. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, International Cooperation to End Tax
Crimes Crucial for Achieving Sustainable Growth Agenda, Speakers Say as Development
Financing Forum Concludes, U.N. Press Release ECOSOC/6840 (May 25, 2017).

8. See Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-

exchange/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); see also Brief on the State of Play on the International Tax
Transparency Standards, OECD at 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-taxinformation/brief-and-FAQ-on-progress-on-tax-transparency.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Council Directive 2015/849, art. 114, 2015 OJ. (L 141) 5, 30 31 (EU).
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resistance of certain jurisdictions and particularly the United States. 10
Secondly, even in the jurisdictions that are participating in these measures,
effectiveness will be dependent on national regulators and enforcement
agencies and on the extent of resources devoted to them by national
governments. Many of these domestic agencies will, furthermore, face a
conflict of interest between their desire to participate in multilateral
initiatives (if only for reputational reasons) and the political need to support
domestic professional constituencies economically dependent on corporate
and financial services to non-residents. A third difficulty is that the
effectiveness of the new measures will depend on the quality of information
that is maintained by local service agents, which as will be explained below
can be problematic. In the face of the new disclosure rules, novel methods
of structuring and concealment will probably also be devised by the
corporate services professions." It is to be feared, therefore, that the new
regulatory measures will not be enough to put an end to the harmful effects
2
of shell company proliferation in the global economy.
In this context, if one accepts that there is indeed a problem with shell
company proliferation in the first place, 3 should it not then be necessary to
10. On the United States and its position on exchange of information and corporate
transparency, see below.
11. See, e.g., MARK FENWICK & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, Focus 14: DISCLOSURE OF
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP AFTER THE PANAMA PAPERS 50 (2016) ("Much of the commentary in
the immediate aftermath of the release of the Panama Papers was characterized by ...calls for
stricter and more stringent rules that attempt to force more information into the public domain.
Unsurprisingly, the regulatory strategies particularly focus on the disclosure of 'ultimate
beneficial ownership' as a prerequisite in preventing tax evasion, tax avoidance, money
laundering, and corruption (for example, see Economist 2016)."). The authors then comment
that
[i]f people are determined to conceal, or at least obscure, their beneficial ownership
of a company, then they are going to be able to find the techniques to do so. There
are enough lawful strategies available to make this possible even without having to
have recourse to misrepresentation. From this perspective, simply ratcheting up the
disclosure requirements to force the information into the public domain seems
unlikely to be effective and merely encourages new and more imaginative means of
circumvention.
Id.
12. It is revealing that very few consolidated figures are available on the number of global
incorporations, particularly in offshore hubs. In 2013, The Economist estimated total
incorporated companies at 1,045,000 in Hong Kong, 945,000 in Delaware, 473,000 in the
British Virgin Islands, 92,000 in the Cayman Islands, 33,000 in Jersey and 17,000 in Bermuda;
these figures were on the basis of combined sources and seem inferior to other estimates. See
Matthew Valencia, Storm Survivors, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, at 2. The OECD's
estimate of BVI incorporation numbers in 2013 was 850,000. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON
TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE

OF INFORMATION FOR TAx

PURPOSES PEER REVIEWS:

VIRGIN ISLANDS (BRITISH) (2013).

13. The idea that there is a problem tends to be resisted in the legal and finance professions, in
sharp contrast with the general public's indignation that followed the Panama Papers and
subsequent scandals. As US President Barack Obama pointed out at the time, "the problem is
that a lot of this stuff is legal, not illegal." See Rupert Neate & David Smith, Obama Calls for
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also examine the private law reasons for their success as legal institutions, i.e.
beyond their tax benefits and the anonymity they sometimes confer? What
constitutive elements of existing private law systems underpin their success,
what do these underpinnings tell us about the evolution of private law over
recent decades, and what private law tools can still be deployed to address
their proliferation? While these wider questions form the intellectual
backdrop behind this paper,14 this paper is limited to two specific fields of
analysis. The first field is the private international law (continental Europe's
equivalent of "conflicts of law" in the US) applicable to companies. Before
anonymity or tax benefits, the first reason shell companies were able to
become a fixture of global financial flows is their quasi-unconditional
international recognition as legal persons endowed with the full range of
civil rights: the capacity to own assets, enter into contracts, sue, and offer
limitation of liability. In historical light, these benefits should be viewed as
privileges, yet they now come at virtually no cost. By their very definition,
shell companies do not need to have physical substance, offices, or
employees in their jurisdictions of incorporation.'5 Their corporate organs
can be composed of professional nominees for whom fiduciary duties can be
reduced or even eliminated by operation of law or contract. 6 In recent
decades, private international law moved to entrench the unilateral power of
the domestic law of incorporation to govern all questions of corporate
existence and governance, over and above the private laws of where
shareholders reside, activities are managed, assets are held, or income is
generated; in the United States, this theory is known as the "internal affairs
doctrine".' 7 In comparative terms, the influence of legal systems more
attentive to the requirement that there be actual local substance behind legal
personality, i.e. the so-called "real seat" jurisdictions like Germany and
others, is in decline.'s Contrary to these evolutions, the normative position
that is defended in this paper is that if one adopts a wider view of the
interests at stake, the real seat theory of corporate existence is intrinsically
superior, and therefore jurisdictions in which foreign shell companies deploy
their effects should retain the ability to re-characterize, disregard or look
InternationalTax Reform Amid PanamaPapers Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016), https:/
/www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/05/justice-department-panama-papers-mossack-fonse
ca-us -investigation; see also Brooke Harrington, Panama Papers: The Real Scandal is What's Legal,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/panamapapers-crimes/477156/.
14. This approach follows in the footsteps of scholars like Katharina Pistor, who have sought
to map out the wider socio-economic effects throughout history of key private law institutions

such as property, contract, corporations and trusts. See

KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF

How THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY (forthcoming May 2019).
15. See discussion infra Section II.
16. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
17. Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW

CAPITAL:

AND CONTEMP. PROBS.

161, 162 (1985). McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del.

1987).
18. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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behind these companies, or at the very least apply domestic governance
standards to them, with minimal or no deference to the laws of the place of
incorporation.
The second axis of analysis regards the theory and substantive standards of
corporate law itself. The competing "theories of the corporation" debated
by legal theorists a century ago are now confined to legal history. They have
been replaced by contractarian, law and economics influenced theories that
pay little attention to the institutional dimension of legal personality or
corporate "seat."' 19 While a debate on the "race to the bottom" of corporate
law did take place within the United States and European Union, there is no
academic consensus. 20 Yet it would seem quite evident, certainly to most
practitioners, that active competition is indeed taking place on a planetary
level between incorporation hubs seeking to serve an increasingly global
market,21 and that the very existence of that market is dependent on
continuation of the current paradigm of unconditional international
recognition of corporate personality. This article will also argue that some
of the consequences of the competition between incorporation hubs have
been to reduce local substance obligations, over-extend corporate services
supply chains and dilute the responsibility of agents and fiduciaries
participating in the chain.22
How did all of this come about in the first place? What we see today is
the combined result of singular evolutions over several decades that occurred
in parallel and may be, to a certain extent, entirely unrelated. The
jurisprudential decline of corporate "theories of the corporation" and ascent
of contractarian analyses was integral to the law and economics movement
that began in the seventies in the United States. In the European Union, the
real seat theory met its demise as a result of the European Court of Justice's
(ECJ) peculiar mode of protection of intra-EU freedom of establishment. In
the emerging world and particularly post-communist countries, legacy
private law systems remain under the influence of positivist legal traditions
that are naturally deferent more to form than substance or economic reality.
The geographical extent of the English colonial legacy distributed not only
the incorporation theory but also the traditional English deference to
limited liability and high English threshold in corporate veil piercing. And
finally, many jurisdictions have become dependent for economic success on
preservation of the global market for incorporation services. All these
19. See discussion infra Section III.E.
20. The literature on this topic is voluminous. For two comparatively recent contributions
regarding the EU and US respectively, see Andrea Zorzi, A European Nevada? Bad Enforcement
as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations, 18 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 251 (2017), and
Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations 23 32 (NYU Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 14-19, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=24746
58.
21. See discussion infra Section III.D.
22. See discussion infra Section IV.
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individual factors snowballed to solidly entrench the systemic role that shell
companies now play in the global economy.
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 begins with a brief
definitional overview using examples from fields that are exterior to
corporate law. Indeed, to understand what a "shell" company is, one must
paradoxically look outside of corporate law. This section will emphasize
how in public law disciplines, the general objective has been to disregard or
set aside legal personality in order to achieve more desirable outcomes. In
contrast, Section 2 will examine the private law persistence of quasiunconditional recognition of these structures, particularly in the field of
private international law. It will address the accumulation of trends and
evolutions that led to the current situation where shell companies have
become a constitutive element of the global economy that is perceived as
entirely normal from a private law standpoint. Section 3 will then set out
some of the more harmful consequences of these combined evolutions on
the substantive standards of corporate law itself, in the form of excessive
corporate confidentiality and dilution of fiduciary duty. Before the final
conclusion, Section 4 will attempt to identify what remedial private law
measures could still be possible, however, even within the present prevailing
paradigms of corporate and private international law. The remedies that are
examined include statutory limitations of rights, reducing or removing any
deference to the incorporation law in international corporate veil piercing
proceedings, and compiling international "best standards" of substantive
corporate law that could serve as soft law benchmarks similar to current
FATF/OECD initiatives in the fields of taxation and money laundering.
To conclude this introduction, it is worth mentioning that while this
article does not make any conceptual distinction between foreign or
domestic shell companies, the fact remains that from the standpoint of any
particular jurisdiction, foreign shell companies are functionally more
problematic. Because of the geographical dispersion of their shareholders,
management bodies, assets and counterparties, they are more likely to fall
into the cracks between national regulatory regimes. Cross-border civil or
criminal judicial action remains excessively time-consuming and resourceintensive for both private plaintiffs and governments. The main focus of the
article will therefore be on the treatment of foreign shell companies in crossborder situations. In terms of legal systems, the article draws mostly on
United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), French, German and European
Union (EU) law. It does not conduct a detailed analysis of the relevant
segments in all these systems (which would be an impossible task) but adopts
a selective approach to emphasize certain points. It can of course be argued,
contra the position in this article, that existing private legal toolkits-for
example corporate veil piercing- already do the job to address risks posed
by shell companies in discrete cases as between private parties, and that for
the rest problems must be addressed by public law regulation. The general
position that will be defended in this article, in contrast, is in favor of
extending to private law a critical public law style, fact-centric, substancePUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
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over-form approach to shell companies ex ante, contra the alternative of
default deference to incorporation law. There should be no compunction in
applying significant amounts of private "forum law" to foreign shell
companies even before disputes arise. From the standpoint of conflicts of
law theory, this would mean rehabilitating the real seat theory or adopting a
form of international choice-of-law "eclecticism" similar to that propounded
by US conflicts scholars in the past.23 While it is accepted that this may lead
to increased uncertainty in border line cases, there are powerful counterarguments: the current system carries significant costs (or negative
externalities, to use the language of law and economics), which include
facilitation of tax evasion, money laundering and ordinary fraud; nothing
prohibits private ordering from taking greater account of the public interest;
and greater structuring simplicity in international corporate and
transactional practice could after all be viewed not as the mark of insufficient
imagination or deftness on the part of legal advisers, but as a virtuous
objective worthy of being pursued.
II. When is a Company a "Shell"? The Paradox of the Public/
Private Divide
Corporate law, ironically, is usually silent as to the very concept of a "shell
company."24 That is because a shell company, for company law, is not
constitutively different from any other company. For a definition of the
"shell" element, it is necessary to look outside of corporate law to other
disciplines that are usually public-law centric. There, the expressions
become multiple: "mailbox" companies,25 "letter-box" companies,26 "front"
companies,2 7 "brass-plate" companies,28 "sham" companies,29 "shelf' or
23. James E. Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The
Case for Eclecticism, 40.3 Mo.L. REv. 407, 407 11 (1975); Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A
Well-WateredPlateau,41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 10 11 (1977).
24. This is reflected, for example, by the absence of the expression "shell company" in the
indexes of most corporate law textbooks.
25. Concept Paper, European Commission, Investment in TTIP and Beyond The Path for
Reform, at 2 (May 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc-153408.pdf.
26. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813, 35; Case C-196/04, Cadbury
Schweppes & Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 68 ("Thus, a fictitious
presence, such as that of a 'letter box' or 'brass plate' company, cannot be described as a place of
business for the purposes of Article 1(1) of the Thirteenth Directive); Case C-73/06, Pflanzer
Luxembourg, 2007 E.C.R. 1-5655; PASCHALIS PASCHALIDES, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT
AND PRWATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR CORPORATIONS 95 124 (2012) (Paschalide's

definition is "companies that do not retain any connection with their State of incorporation,
other than a mere letter-box" adding that "this is the core meaning of the term .

27. Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995.
28. Pflanzer Luxembourg, 2007 ECR 1-5655.
29. Jeffrey Zients, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/
investor-state -dispute-settlement-isds -questions.
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"conduit" companies.30 Less derogatory expressions used to designate these
structures are "holding companies" and "special purpose entities."' 31 During
the corporate veil piercing process (more on this later), the terms
used in
'
various legal systems involve concepts such as "alter ego,"32 "fagade,"
"cloak," "sham"33 or "straw-man."34 These concepts are not particular to
corporate law: rather, they are terms of general contract or agency law.
In dealing with shell companies, the public/private legal divide remains
very relevant. The regulatory disciplines belonging by and large to the
realm of public law tend to adopt a purposive and fact-based substance-overform approach to entity characterization. In contrast, the private law
disciplines (including contract or tort law, and corporate law itself), while
varying between countries, are much more protective of corporate
personality: the underlying policy in these disciplines is to uphold party
autonomy and the expectations of private parties perceived to be legitimate.
These two continents have slowly diverged in past decades: private law
disciplines are generally accepting of shell companies, while public law
disciplines are much more skeptical. The clearer it is that a public interest is
at stake, the more shell companies are disregarded to focus on the activities
of parents or controlling persons instead.
Unsurprisingly, the strongest expression of substance-over-form
skepticism about shell companies is found in the field of taxation. Virtually
all modern tax systems use techniques characterizing shell companies as
30. The "conduit" expression is generally used in the context of taxation. See, e.g., OECD.

Double Taxation Convention and the Use of Conduit Companies R(6)-2, which defines conduit
companies as legal entities created solely for the purpose of obtaining tax treaty benefits which

would not otherwise be available. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-conventionon-income-and-on-capital- 2014-full -version/r-6 -double -taxation-conventions-and-the-use- ofconduit-companies_9789264239081-99-en#pagel.
31. The designation of special purpose entity ("SPE") is favored by international bodies. See
OECD.,

BENCHMARK

DEFINITION

OF

FOREIGN

INVESTMENT

11

(2008);

OECD.,

IMPLEMENTING THE LATEST INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COMPILING FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT

STATISTICS:

How MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES

CHANNEL INVESTMENTS

THROUGH MULTIPLE COUNTRIES 1 (2015); see StructuredInvestment Vehicle (SIT), CORP. FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/siv-

structured-investment-vehicle/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); see also U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, at 3, 86,
U.N. Doc UNCTAD/WJVR/2014 (Box 1.1 on treatment of "transit FDI"). It is also the
terminology used in the structured finance industry, together with "special purpose vehicle"
("SPV") or "structured investment vehicle" ("SIV").
32. In the United States, the "alter ego" doctrine refers to the use of the law of agency to lift
limited liability (with basic reasoning set out in the seminal case Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223
N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966)); see

M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED
87-97 (2016).
33. The three expressions are used in Adams v. Cape Industries PLC, the English case that is
widely considered to have narrowed the ability to lift corporate veils. See Adams v. Cape
STEPHEN M. BRAINBRIDGE &

LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Industries PLC [1990] Ch 433 (Jan. 2, 1990).
34. MATHIAS SIEMS & DAVID CABRELLI, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED
APPROACH 166 (Mathias Siems et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2018) Japanese doctrine, cited by Hisaei Ito
and Hiroyuki Watanabe).
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"controlled foreign corporations" (CFCs) when they are established in lowtax jurisdictions: these doctrines allow the separate legal personality of the
corporation to be disregarded and its income to be taxed directly in the
hands of the shareholders or controlling persons. 35 The seminal EU case,
36
Cadbury Schweppes, was about the low-tax Irish subsidiary of a UK parent.
In Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ permitted CFC regimes to exist within the
EU whenever, regardless of tax motives, the fact of incorporation did not
reflect "genuine economic" reality, which would in turn be based on
"objective factors ... ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular,
to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff
and equipment."3r In other words it was accepted that for purposes of
taxation, the separate legal personality of "letterbox" or "front" companies
without substance in the form of premises, staff or equipment in their place
of incorporation could be entirely ignored.
Before the Cadbury Schweppes decision, the ECJ had dealt with shell
companies for the determination of the proper insolvency law under the EU
Insolvency Regulation (this was the Eurofood case).38 In Eurofood the ECJ
held that a shell company (called a "letterbox" company by the Court) is a
company that does not carry out any business in its territory of registration,
and for which there are "objective" and "third part[y]" - ascertainable factors
establishing that the company's "actual situation [is] different" from that
which is deemed to be reflected by its apparent location at its registered
office. 39 The registered office creates a presumption, but that presumption
is rebuttable by way of a public law style substance-over-form analysis.40
Even if insolvency law is not generally considered to be a public law
discipline, the "center of main interests" (COMI) connecting factor used in
the EU involves a substance-over-form analysis according only limited
deference to the choice of the place of registration by the shareholders, the
goal being to protect the collective interest of creditors. In this discipline
too, party autonomy in corporate structuring by the founding shareholders
must cede the way to economic reality in the interest of creditor protection.
The same pragmatism vis-h-vis formal incorporation exists in US bankruptcy
law: for Chapter 11 to apply to a foreign incorporated entity it is enough for
the entity to have a "place of business" in the US, which does not need to be
its principal place of business, nor does the entity need to own property in
35. OECD, Designing Effective Foreign Controlled Company Rules Action 3, FinalReport 2015;
at http://www.oecd.org/tax/designing-effective-controlled-foreign-company-rules-action-32015 -final -report-9789264241152 -en.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
36. Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995.
37. Id. at 1-8051 52. To be complete on this subject, some tax critics have considered that the
ECJ's threshold in Cadbury Schweppes, in particular its reference to "wholly artificial"
arrangements, was too narrow and that pre-Cadbury CFC regimes in many EU countries were
more appropriately protective of legitimate revenue concerns.
38. See Eurofood IFSC, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813 (required interpreting the expression "center of
main interests," which is the "COMI" connecting factor used by the regulation).
39. Id. at 1-3879.
40. Id.
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the US.41 Competition with foreign proceedings will then be resolved
taking into account comity and forum non conveniens factors such as the
location of the evidence and key witnesses: in the case of a shell company,
this will often be elsewhere than in the formal place of incorporation.42
Shell companies are also addressed in securities laws: there, the objective
will generally be to restrict access to open securities markets. Under US
securities law, a shell company is a "company [. .] with no or nominal
operations; and either no or nominal assets, assets consisting of cash and
cash equivalents, or assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash
equivalents and nominal other assets."43 Such companies are excluded from
the resale exemption under Rule 144 (there are two exceptions however, one
for "asset-backed issuers," i.e. SPVs in the structured finance industry, and
the other for shell companies that are affiliates of larger groups undertaking
a restructuring).44 The purpose of this rule is to protect the ordinary
investing public: companies that are devoid of physical operations and
employees are restricted from simplified private placement rules and can
only sell their securities if they have undergone full registration with the
45
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Yet another discipline dealing with the position of shell companies is
investment arbitration.46 The task of investment tribunals is to interpret
what constitutes a "foreign investor" that can properly claim treaty
benefits. 47 Unfortunately, decision-making by investment tribunals on this
question has erred towards excessive formalism in past decades and many
48
tribunals have unreservedly accorded treaty benefits to shell companies.
There were decisions that went the other way, however. To cite but one
example, in Pac Rim v El Salvador, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal sought to distinguish between shell
41. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2016).

42. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Bank of Anguilla (Private Banking Tr.) Ltd., 680 B.R. 64, 97 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2018) (for a recent example of aforum non conveniens determination by the Bankruptcy
Court of the SDNY in favor of Anguilla over the United Stated. The debtors, two Anguillan
banks, were not true shells, however, and the creditors filing in the United States had done so

after principal proceedings had begun in Anguilla).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1934).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1933).
45. Investor Publications, Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N. (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubs
rule l44htm.html.
46. Investment arbitration, of course, is not universally accepted to belong to the realm of

public law. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System, 107 Am.J. INT'L. L. 45, 64 (2013).
47. This is a short-cut summary of the task. In most investment treaties this means
understanding the definition of a "resident" company in the contracting state. Under the
ICSID convention, the test is whether a company is a "national" of the contracting state. The
task also involved interpreting and applying denial-of-benefits clauses when they exist.
48. Mark Feldman, Setting Limits on Corporate Nationality Planning in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 27 ICSID REV. 281, 281 (2012); Delphine Nougayr&de, Yukos, Investment Round-

Tripping, and the Evolving Public/PrivateParadigms 26 Am.REV.

INT'L ARB.
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companies and "traditional holding companies": the latter "usually have a
board of directors, board minutes, a continuous physical presence and a bank
account," whereas shell companies "normally" have "no geographic location
for [their] nominal, passive, limited and insubstantial activities." 49 The
company under examination was a Nevada-registered LLC that had just
been redomiciled there from the Cayman Islands.50 The tribunal found that
it should fall into the second category, that of shell companies: not having
any employees, bank account, office or any clear governance structure, it
could not claim treaty benefits. 51 Because arbitral tribunals were
inconsistent in the past on this fundamental question, the express exclusion
of shell companies from the benefit of future investment treaties is now an
articulated priority for most governments. 52 One might have imagined, of
course, that investment tribunals would have realized the sensitive policy
dimension of these determinations much earlier. Investment arbitration
involves states as defendants: it seems entirely appropriate that the treatment
of shell companies in this field be colored by a public-law approach akin to
that followed in taxation or insolvency law, and that deference to
shareholders' ex ante selection of place of incorporation be set aside in the
absence of actual substance.
A final example is that of intergovernmental standard-setting bodies. For
the FATF-which produces global standards in anti-money laundering
law-"shell companies" are defined as "companies that are incorporated [in
a certain territory but] have no significant operations or related assets" in
that territory. 53 The FATF views these structures as highly exposed to
money laundering and has long recommended that their ultimate beneficial
owners be identified. 54 The OECD, for its part, issues standards in
international statistics production and taxation.55 As regards statistics
production, the OECD defines a shell company as a company "that is
formally registered, incorporated or otherwise legally organized in an
economy but which does not conduct any operations in that economy other
49. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on
the Respondent's Jurisdictional Objections I 4.72, 4.75 (June 1, 2012).
50. Id. JJ 5.43 5.44.
51. Id.
4.69 4.75.
52. See European Commissiont, Concept Paper:Investment in TTIP and Beyond, supra note 25, at
2 (for the European Union) (writing regarding the TTIP that "'mailbox' companies will not be
able to bring cases to arbitration. Only companies with real business operations in the territory
of one of the Parties will be covered by the investment protection provisions."); see Jeffrey
Zients, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOC (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-statedispute -settlement-isds-questions -and-answers (for the United States) (writing in defense of the
Transpacific Partnership agreement that "TPP will prevent sham corporations from accessing
the investment protections provided by the agreement.").
53. GUIDANCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 6 n. 15.

54. Id.
55.

BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT,

supra note 31, at 2.
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than in a pass-through capacity."56 Their recommendation is that amounts
transiting through such entities be excluded from national data on crossborder investment flows, in favor of ultimate source and destination
countries, and that countries hosting "special purpose entities" (SPEs) (in
other words incorporation hubs) maintain separate sets of data for those
structures.5 7 In the field of international taxation, the OECD's
recommendation in recent years is that likewise, tax treaties be interpreted in
a manner reinforcing the substance-over-form bent of interpretation, to
ensure that beneficial ownership of income flows prevail over formal legal
entitlement as a result of private ordering.58
To summarize, the common approach to shell companies that is revealed
in all these fields is to ignore the manifestations of legal personality in order
to protect important third party interests: the public purse, ordinary
creditors, the investing public and defendant host states (and also,
incidentally, to try to present more meaningful statistics on international
economic flows). When there are no physical assets, offices, or employees,
common sense commands that economic substance prevail over legal
formality.59 This is a cascade of policy-oriented disciplines going to great
effort to remove the artificial consequences of shell company proliferation.
And yet, the private laws used to create these very structures in the first place
seem oblivious to these efforts and retain their natural deference to form and
formality. We now turn to this private law approach.
III. Shell Companies in Private Law: Form over Substance and
International Competition
Private law doctrines that determine when corporate personality can be
defeated do of course exist. They come in varying forms in the different
national traditions: "piercing" or "lifting" the corporate veil in the AngloAmerican tradition, durchgriffshaftung in the German tradition, "abuse of
law," fraud (fraude la loi), simulation and fictitiousness (fictivite) in the
French tradition, to name a few. On the whole, these doctrines operate ex
post, i.e. once a dispute has arisen. At that point they require the assessment
of indicia such as degree of respect of corporate formalities, role and conduct
of the corporate organs, presence or absence of physical premises, employees
or assets, commingling of funds or assets, level of capitalization and, most
56. Id. at 101.
57. Id. at 102.
58. Tax treaty interpretation to prevent abuse is one of the planks of the OECD initiative
against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS"). See Action 6 Treaty Abuse, OECD., http://
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
59. A similar approach to shell companies has now been adopted in international accounting
standards. Under IFRS the consolidation of special purpose entities used to be governed by
SIC-12. It was then replaced by IFRS 10 (2012) which uses a more synthetic approach. IFRS
10 Consolidated FinancialStatements, INT'L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS, https://www.ifrs.org/
issued-standards/list-of-standards/ifrs- 10-consolidated-financial-statements/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2019); BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 101.
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importantly in some jurisdictions, use of the company for the commission of
fraud or injustice.60 The general point made here is that these thresholds for
defeating corporate personality (and attendant limited liability) are often
high, and the process is likely to entail significant legal costs for plaintiffs.
The threshold is particularly high in the English tradition, as was illustrated
again in a recent case also indicative of the extent of international shell
company use by Russian businesses.61 If thresholds are high in purely
domestic contexts, things are more complicated still when dealing with
foreign companies, because of private international law's evolution towards
automatic recognition of foreign legal personality and its deference to the
foreign law of incorporation. In contrast, a century ago, treaties were often
necessary to ensure full recognition of foreign companies.62 The paragraphs
that follow propose a narrative of the historical evolution that led to where
we are now.
A.

FOREIGN COMPANIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE

INCORPORATION THEORY VERSUS THE "REAL SEAT"
THEORY

The treatment of foreign companies in a national system depends first and
foremost on the policy that underlies the domestic company law of that
system: when a state confers legal personhood to a company, does it content
itself with completion of certain registration formalities only, or does it also
require that the company being formed have a genuine economic connection
with its territory? As is well known there are two competing approaches to
this question, which are underpinned by different "theories of the
corporation" (more on this later) and expressed in domestic rules of both
corporate law and private international law. The first approach is the
"incorporation theory," according to which legal personality is conferred on
the basis of registration formalities regardless of economic connection with
the state of incorporation. This is the philosophy that has historically
prevailed in the UK, in its former colonies, and in the United States (where
it gave rise to the internal affairs doctrine). The other theory is that of the
60. For

a

detailed

VANDEKERCKHOVE,

comparative

PIERCING

analysis

of veil

THE CORPORATE

VEIL

piercing

doctrine,

(WOLTERS KLUWER,

MARCO VENTORUZZO ET AL., COMPARATWVE CORPORATE LAW

see

KAREN

2007); see also

151 (West Academic, 2015).

In some countries, separate veil piercing doctrines have been developed in the context of
insolvency law (for example 'action en combement de passif in French law, or 'substantive
consolidation' in US federal law). See French Bankruptcy Law Amendments, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP (Apr. 17, 2012), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublica
tionFrench BankruptcyLawAmendments4-17 -12 .pdf.
61. The facts of the case involved a number of corporate structures under the control of a
single Russian individual, including in jurisdictions such as Cyprus or the Marshall Islands.
VTB Capital Plc v. Nutritek International Corp and Others [2013] UKSC 5 (Eng.).
62. W.F. Hamilton, Recognition of Foreign Companies, 8 J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L. 129, 131
("As between different countries the matter is often dealt with by treaties providing for
reciprocal recognition of the companies respectively formed in the treaty-making states.").
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"real seat," applied in Germany, France, Belgium and other countries of
Continental Europe. In these countries, corporate law institutions were
primarily expected to organize and support local economic activity which
was conducted from that territory, i.e. for businesses which had a real seat of
management in the territory. These two competing theories use different
"connecting factors" to determine the law that governs corporate existence
and governance: either the place of incorporation, or the place of the real
seat. At this point in time, admittedly, many comparative studies consider
that the two paradigmatic categories have become blurred. 63 France, for
example, is sometimes described as a "hybrid" system, owing to the fact that
the registered office creates a presumption (however rebuttable). Yet
significant practical differences remain. In the French system, to this day
the registered office of a company cannot be a mere mailbox.64 It must
correspond to minimum physical reality and space available for use by
company staff.65 This is very different from the situation in incorporation
theory jurisdictions where companies can be pre-incorporated by registered
agents in the dozens and then sold off-the-shelf at nominal price.
Although they primarily address the existence of domestic companies,
these two competing theories of private international law naturally color the
manner in which foreign companies are approached. Incorporation theory
jurisdictions recognize foreign companies regardless of location of their
actual seat of management or center of activities, because this is of no
interest in their own law vis-4-vis domestic companies. In England, Dicey's
The Conflict of Laws writes that "the existence . . . of a foreign corporation
duly created . . . under the law of a foreign country is recognized in
England."66 English law will not seek to verify the underlying principles of
the foreign corporate law and does not care whether the foreign company
has any genuine economic activity in its territory of incorporation (as this is
not relevant for its own companies). In the U.S., the Second Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws likewise states that "incorporation by one state will be

63.

LSE
64.

CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., STUDY ON DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITY XV

ENTERPRISE, at

226 (2013).

CODE DE COMMERCE

[C.

COM.] art.

L122-3 (Fr.).

65. Domiciliation services were first allowed in 1984/1985 and then expanded by a decree of
30 December 2008. A copy of the domiciliation agreement must be filed with the registrar of
companies upon registration. FRANCE COMPANY LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK VOLUME 1 STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND BASIC LAWS 161 (Int'l Bus. Publications, USA eds.,

2015). On the French government's anti-money laundering supervisory role on domiciliation
services specifically, see Direction Generale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la
Repression des Fraudes, La domiciliation d'entreprise : Une gestion a risques, https://www
.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/domiciliation-dentreprise-gestion-a-risques (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
On the French requirement for substance, Agnes Bougnous, Siege Sociale, Jurisclasseur Societes
Fasc. 28-30 (2014), with court references therein.

66.

ALBERT V.

DICEY ET AL., THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

1339 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds.,

14th ed. 2006); see also Foreign Corporations Act 1991, c. 44, §1, (Eng.).
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recognized by others." 67 The main advantage of the doctrine, it is said, is its
simplicity and predictability.
The real seat doctrine, for its part, applies a more critical lens to foreign
companies. The first country to codify it was Belgium, by a law of May 18,
1873,68 and the doctrine was later imported in France by the courts
specifically as an anti-abuse mechanism to combat the incorporation
elsewhere, at the time primarily in the UK, of companies conducting their
main activity in France.69 In Germany, the real seat theory (Sitztheorie) was
first articulated (though apparently not codified) in 188470 and was applied
consistently throughout the 20th century by the courts, until the recent EU
developments that will be addressed below. Under the Sitztheorie, a business
having its seat in Germany was required to incorporate in Germany and
conversely, if the seat was foreign, German corporate law was unavailable.71
The theory led to denial of the legal existence of companies incorporated
abroad if it transpired that in fact, their real seat of activities was in
Germany.72
In these real seat countries, unconditional recognition of foreign
companies regardless of location of seat required express executive or
legislative intervention to that effect, either in domestic law or by treaty. In
France, recognition of foreign joint-stock companies was dependent on a
French executive decree per country under a 1857 law; such decrees were
adopted for all countries with which there were significant trade ties: Italy in
1860, Luxembourg in 1861 or the Netherlands in 1863, for example.73 For
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §297 (Am. Law Inst., 1971). The
activities of foreign corporations, including access to state courts, may however be subject to so
called "qualification statutes." The US peculiarity, of course, is that "foreign corporations"
include both non-US corporations (alien corporations) and US corporations registered in
another state.
68. ALINE KLHNE, DIE ANERKENNUNG I GESELLSCHAFTEN vi FRANZOSISCHEN UND
DEUTSCHEN RECHTSKREIS 260 (Duncker & Humblot Berlin, 1st ed. 2014).
69. See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass] [supreme court for judicial matters] Civ. December 22,
1896 (1897) 24 Journal du Droit International 364 (Fr.), which ruled that a limited liability
company created in England by a French founder was a nullity because it had only a nominal
and fictitious seat in England, had not centralized its administration there, did not appear there
to third parties, only had a secretary without any authority whose role was to copy the balance
sheets and minutes all produced in Paris where the directors resided and met, and because its
operations took place in France only. See also PASCHALIDES, supra note 26, at 112.

70. KLHNE, supra note 68, at 332.
71. Werner F. Ebke, The "Real Seat" Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36

INT'L

L.

1015, 1021 1022 (2002).

72. Regarding a Gibraltar company, see for example the case cited by Roger Drury, in his
prescient article on this topic in 1998, i.e. before the ECJ Centros case. See Roger Drury, The
Regulation and Recognition of Foreign Corporations: Responses to the Delaware Syndrome, 57
CAMBRIDGE

L.

REV.

165, 178 (1998).

73. YVON LoussouARN ET AL., Societes Etrangres en France, Jurisclasseur Societes Fasc.
194 10 & International Fasc. 570 30 (2013),
15, 28. The recognition of foreign limited
liability companies was easier. This is perhaps because the French equivalent of limited liability
companies, societ& de personnes, places institutional emphasis on the identity of individual
members and are therefore akin to partnerships or contracts in the common law tradition rather
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US companies, French unconditional recognition was obtained by way of
treaty in 1959. 74 Companies registered in British overseas territories were
recognized in France on the basis of treaties with the UK;75 and for

jurisdictions that did not have a decree or treaty, French courts applied most
favored nation clauses.76 Treaty-based recognition was practiced in other
real seat jurisdictions as well, for example Germany7 or Italy.78 In these
systems, unconditional recognition of foreign legal persons was not a given
and required political intervention.79
Admittedly, the real seat theory has never been without its flaws. Critics
point to the lack of uniformity of what exactly constitutes a "real" seat.
Depending on the countries this might be either the head office from which
senior management directs day-to-day activities, or the place where the
board of directors meet, or perhaps the place where shareholders meet.80 It
was, deep down, an ambitious theory. An early US admirer was Elvin Latty,
who was a critic of the US internal affairs doctrine. 81 His main concern was
with US "pseudo-foreign corporations," by which he meant corporations
registered in one state but conducting their activities in another.82 For his
critique of the US internal affairs system he found inspiration in the
than companies or corporations. For France, see WILLIAM BURGE, BURGE'S COMMENTARIES
ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS GENERALLY: AND IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH

OTHER AND WITH THE LAW OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 2 223 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1908); for
Luxembourg or the Netherlands, see H. CLEVELAND B. 1859 COXE, MANUAL OF FRENCH LAW
AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION 64 (Nabu Press, 2010).

74. LoUSSOUARN

ET AL., supra note 73, T 63.
75. Pierre Mayer, Commentay, 71 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L PRIVE 81 (1982) (Fr).;
see Drury, supra note 72.
76. George Karaillah, Condition des Etrangers, 80 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L PRVE
667 (1991) and the jugements discussed therein.
77. See Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Ger., Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T.
1839; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MAINLAND CHINA, TAnvAN AND EUROPE 364 79

Jurgen Basedow & Knut B. Kessler eds., 2014).
78. See Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation, U.S.- It., art. II, Feb. 2, 1948, 63
Stat. 2255.
79. The wider argument can indeed be made that the inherently political dimension of much
of private international law has been forgotten. Earlier conceptions of the field were more
aware of that dimension. In 1949, French author J. P. Niboyet wrote that
the determination of rights that foreigners [including foreign companies] may enjoy
in France, or that are denied them, is dominated.., by the policies of the state in its
foreign relations [politique internationale], and the facts of the problem are
extremely variable. There are first diplomatic facts, which are facts of international
politics. The problem is also dominated by elements of economic policy. There
may be reasons of high politics to grant or deny certain rights to foreigners. There
are also elements of essentially social policy. Finally, there are demographic
elements pertaining to the problem of immigration.
J.P.

NIBOYET, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANAIS

60 61 (Recueil Sirey ed.,

J.P. Niboyet trans., 2d ed. 1949) (Fr.).
80. See Gerner-Beuerle infra note 137.
81. See Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations,65 YALE L. J. 137, 172-73 (1955).
82. Id.
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continental European approach: "at least in one important respect
Continental doctrine is more penetrating than ours: it invariably looks
beyond the mere shell of formal incorporation to the core of business
reality." 83 Contemporary critics of shareholder primacy in today's US
corporate law are also supportive of the real seat theory, because they view it
as inherently conducive to multi-stakeholder governance: "the real seat
doctrine is how Germany can continue to enforce its [worker]
codetermination model, and it is how Japan can enforce its own standards on
Japanese companies."
B.

84

THE DECLINE OF THE REAL SEAT THEORY IN EUROPE

Despite the support that it enjoys in certain circles, the real seat theory is
now in decline in its historical birthplace of continental Europe. 85 For
decades the co-existence within the EU of two competing traditions meant
that no common directive or regulation could be adopted to address the
private international law of companies. The six founding members did sign
the Convention on Mutual Recognition in 1968, which endorsed the real
seat doctrine,86 but the Netherlands later changed its tack and refused to
ratify it. 87 Subsequent evolution then progressively favored and consolidated
the incorporation theory bit by bit. The 1968 Brussels Convention on
Jurisdictional Matters and the 1980 Rome Convention on Contractual
Obligations set down the rule that for European companies, questions
regarding the "constitution, nullity or dissolution" of companies would be
83. Id. at 171 72.

84.

DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION: How CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES AMERICAN

PROGRESS AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 191 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018).

85. See GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., supra note 63, at 225.
86. Convention of the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate, art. 3 4,
Feb. 29, 1968, 2 Bull. Eur. Communities Supp. 1969; see BERNARD AUDIT & Louis D'AVOLT,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRVE T 123 (Paris, Economica, 7th ed. 2013). This was the Brussels

Convention of February 26, 1968 signed between Belgium, Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. According to Article 3:
any Contracting State may declare that it will not apply the present Convention to
any companies or bodies corporate specified in Articles 1 and 2 which have their
real registered seat outside the territories to which the present Convention applies,
if such companies or bodies corporate have no genuine link with the economy of
one of the said territories.
Id. at art. 3. It was followed by Article 4: "Any Contracting State may also declare that it will
apply any of its own legislation which it deems essential, to the companies or bodies corporate
specified in Articles 1 and 2 having their real registered offices on its territory," even if
established under the law of another Contracting State. Id. at art. 4. A number of other treaties
were negotiated for the recognition of foreign companies, but never entered into force either.
For example, a Hague Convention of 1st June 1956, a Council of Europe Convention of 1966
on the establishment of companies and a 1996 Convention on the recognition of legal
personality of NGOs.
87. Drury, supra note 72.
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the exclusive province of the law and national courts of the "seat."s The
definition of the "seat" was referred back to domestic law, but in effect there
could be only one relevant national system as a matter of principle (and not
two or more). 89 For non-European companies not affected by EU treaties or
conventions, deference to the law of incorporation came about through
other mechanisms. To take the French example again, the mechanism was,
rather bizarrely, the European Convention on Human Rights.90 At a certain
point in time, the French courts began to find that denial of personality to
foreign companies was a breach of their fundamental rights under that
Convention, more precisely of the rights to a fair trial and to protection of
property: 91 this is how the legal personality of a Liechtenstein anstalt was
recognized in France for the first time,92 or that of companies registered in
Qatar or Abu Dhabi. 93 This line of judicial decisions ultimately led to the
2007 repeal of the 1857 law requiring an executive decree. 94 When that
occurred, French commentators rued the absence of debate on the principles
that would henceforth underpin the recognition of foreign companies: 91 for
some, the use of the ECHR for this purpose was rather like a strange
"marriage of convenience between the law of human rights and the law of
international commerce."96

A further major change in the regime of foreign company treatment came
with the case law of the European Court of Justice on one of the four pillars
88. EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980), art. 1(e),
June 19, 1980, O.J. L. 266; Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968, art. 16.2, Sep. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1
[hereinafter Brussels Convention].
89. Brussels Convention, supra note 88, at art. 53.
90. European Convention on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S 222.
91. Winfried H. van den Muijsenbergh & Sam Rezai, Corporationsand the European Convention
on Human Rights, 25 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 43 (2012).
92. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Crim., Nov. 12, 1990, 8981851. Bull. crim. No. 337, p. 956 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial
Matters] le civ., June 25, 1991, 90-13849. Bull. civ. No. 207, p. 136 (Fr.); George Karaillah,
Condition des Etrangers, 80 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROVE INT'L PRIVE 669, 672 (1991)
(overturning lower court findings that the anstalt did not have standing to appear because the
legal form had not been recognized by executive decree).
93. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Com., Dec. 5, 1989, 8814840. (Fr.); Karaillah, supra note 92, at 672. In this case there was also a form of quasiestoppel, the Abu Dhabi claimant company having (unsuccessfully) challenged the right of
standing in court of the defendant Qatari company for lack of executive decree-based
recognition, after having deployed the contrary argument in its own favor in prior proceedings
in which it was the defendant.
94. Dominique Bureau, Feu la loi du 20 mai 1857, 97 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L
PRIVt 161 (2008) (Fr).
95. Id.
96. Bertrand de Lamy & Hugues Kenfack, Droit de l'homme et droit du commerce international:la
fin ou le moyen?, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE EDITION GENERALE (7 Juillet 2004) n' 28 (note sous
Cass Com 8 juillet 2003, Banque Internationale pour le commerce et l'industrie de la Guinee,
28 La Semaine Juridique Edition Generale 1285 (2004)); Georges Khairallah, La personnalit
morale en France d'une soite anonyme etrangere, 692 DALLOZ COLLECTION (2004).
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of the constitutive treaties, the principle of freedom of establishment,
through a series of ad hoc judicial decisions starting in 1999. 97 The resulting
construction is complex and has been much debated, but it gives a general
roadmap. In summary, member states can continue to apply either one of
the two theories (incorporation or real seat), but for their domestic
companies only.98 If a member state wishes to make its corporate law
institutions available only to those companies that maintain a real seat in its
territory, it is able to do so. 99 But, that same member state will be bound to
recognize the legal personality of companies formed in an incorporation
theory member state, regardless of where the seat of operations of such
companies may lie. 100
In summary therefore, while the real seat theory technically continues to
exist within the EU, its influence is in decline. Most of the European
member states that currently serve as incorporation hubs (the Netherlands,
Cyprus, Malta, the UK) apply the incorporation theory. 10
The
Netherlands, now the world's leading destination for foreign direct
investment according to some sources, 02 deliberately opted for the
97. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-01459;
Case C-208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-09919; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor
Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E. C. R. 1-10155; Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktat6 es
Szolgiltat6 Bt., 2008 OJ C 44, 21.2.2009.
98. Id.
99. Cartesio, supra note 97 (stating "a Member State has the power to define both the
connecting factor required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of
that Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and that
required if the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status. That power includes
the possibility for that Member State not to permit a company governed by its law to retain that
state if the company intends to reorganise itself in another Member State by moving its seat to
the territory of that latter, thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the national
law of the Member State of incorporation.").
100. Centros, supra note 97, (finding that a U.K. registered limited liability company formed by
Danish individuals with only activity in Denmark is entitled to register a branch in Denmark);
tberseering, supra note 97 finding that Germany must recognize the legal standing of a U.K.
company having moved its actual center of administration (i.e. real seat) to Germany (while
under German law it was required to re-register as a German company). The court found that
the German government's arguments in favor of the real seat doctrine (creditor protection
through minimum charter requirements, protection of minority shareholders, employee
protection through the co-determination model, and taxation imperatives) did not justify
restricting what it viewed as the U.K. company's freedom of establishment, but it noted that it
was "not inconceivable" that such "overriding requirements relating to the general interest"
could, "in certain circumstances" justify restrictions.).
101. GERNER BEL ERLE ET AL., supra note 63, at 225, 228 29 (Luxembourg, however, is an
exception (more on this below)).
102. Netherlands Inward Direct Investment from Top Five Counterpart Economies, INT'L
MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-EIFICE54D6D5&sld
=1482247616261 (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). According to the IMF, total incoming direct
investment into the Netherlands was $5.005 trillion in 2017. In point of comparison, the US
came second, at $4.025 trillion. Clearly most of this investment flowing to the Netherlands is
into SPEs or holding companies for further dispatch elsewhere.
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incorporation theory back in 1959, and it was the country that blocked the
failed 1968 Convention that could have consolidated the real seat theory.103
Even in Belgium, the historical home of the real seat theory, a switch to the
incorporation theory is now on the table, on the argument that it would be
"closer to the needs of business."104
C.

THE PLANETARY SPREAD OF THE INCORPORATION THEORY

This general evolution in favor of the incorporation theory was not
limited to the European Union. In Switzerland, the courts had historically
hesitated between the two theories; the primacy of the incorporation theory
was eventually settled there by legislative intervention in 1987.105 The
incorporation theory has of course long been received in British former
colonies: the fourteen Overseas Territories (which include the Cayman
Islands and the British Virgin Islands), the Crown Dependencies (the
Channel Islands and Isle of Man), EU member states such as Ireland, Cyprus
and Malta, and the Asian financial centers of Hong Kong, Singapore or
Mauritius. Perhaps most meaningful of all, however, is the position at
present of the large emerging-market economies. In these countries as
elsewhere, the private international law of companies is embedded in
national private law systems; but judging at least from three of the five
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries, the
incorporation theory has also become dominant there. As regards India, it is
perhaps not surprising that its conflict of laws should follow the English
model, but the cases of China and Russia are more intriguing. These are
civil code systems with a history of communism; it might have been thought,
therefore, that they would be less naturally deferential to what might after be
viewed as an "Anglo-American" theory of corporate recognition. That is not
the case, however, and both countries practice a form of recognition that is
inspired by the incorporation theory.106

One explanation that can be

proposed for this paradox is that in these countries, the incorporation theory
103. GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., supra note 63, at 228.
104. Marc Van de Looverbosch, Real Seat Theory vs Incorporation Theory: the Belgian Case for
Reform, CORP. FIN. LAB (Feb. 21, 2017), https://corporatefinancelab.org/2017/02/21/real -seattheory-vs -incorporation-theory-the-belgian-case- for-reform/.
105. Code federal de droit international prive suisse [LDIP] [Swiss Federal Law on Private
International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 29, art. 154 (Switz.); see Bertrand Dutoit, Droit
International Prive Suisse, Commentaire de la Loi Federale du 18 Decembre 1987, (Helbing
Lichtenhahn 5th edition, 2016), commentary under Article 154 at 697-701. According to
Dutoit, the court case first confirming the incorporation theory was a decision dated February
4, 1976, which confirmed the Swiss nationality of a company on the grounds that its statutory
seat was in Geneva (regardless of where its shareholders were located). The decision went on to
reserve the position when a seat was fictitious.
106. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii[GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1202 (Russ.); Kwang
H. SUK, Some Observations on the Chinese Private International Law Act, 18 No. 2 GERMAN J.
CHINESE L. 105, 110 11 (2011). The Chinese rule is at Article 14 of the act. On a separate
note, this article describes China as "post-communist" in reference to its economic model
rather than its political governance.
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finds its roots in state-centric positivist legal traditions that are naturally
inclined towards the "concession theory" of companies, according to which
corporate personality must necessarily derive from state fiat. 1 7 There may
also be more contemporary political reasons, connected to the fact that use
of foreign shell companies is frequent in these economies. Throughout the
last two or three decades the Chinese and Russian governments built open
economies integrated with the rest of the world, while at the same time
retaining private law systems with significant weaknesses. 10s Domestic
corporate laws, in particular, were long deemed unattractive by local
business elites keen to use foreign alternatives instead,109 and governing
elites presumably preferred to shield these investor strategies from legislative
or judicial disruption. The important point is that these formerly
communist economies, whether because of legal tradition or contemporary
preferences, now practice the formalistic incorporation theory approach to
company recognition, rather than the complex, substance-over-form, factcentric philosophy that underlies the real seat theory.
D.

A GLOBAL MARKET FOR INCORPORATION SERVICES

The combined result of these singular evolutions is the appearance of a
vibrant global market in incorporation services. In this market, "naked"
shell company administration goes hand in hand with development, within
each incorporation hub, of national areas of industry specialization. Within
the EU, the Netherlands have for many decades been a center for holding
companies within global multinational groups. Luxembourg has become a
generalist incorporation center as well but with a parallel specialization in
finance and investment funds. Ireland historically specialized in asset
finance (for example in aircraft leasing) and then expanded to the technology
sector. Malta was long a center for the shipping industry and is now also
107. Regarding China, see TAo Du,THE

NEW CHINESE CONFLICT-OF-LAw RULES FOR

LEGAL PERSONS: IS THE MIDDLE WAY SENSIBLE?

341 342 (Jurgen Basedow & Knut B. Pissler

eds., 2014); Regarding Russia, see Delphine Nougayrede, OutsourcingLaw inPost-Soviet Russia, 3
J. EURASIAN L. 383 (2013).
108. This is admittedly a sweeping statement that requires unpacking for each individual

segment of private law, a task beyond the scope of this article. On the subject of Chinese
contract law for one example, the editors of a recent monograph write that the need to combine
"private entrepreneurial spirit" with "socialist principles and government authority" led to
general principles of interpretation in the Chinese civil code that seem "confusing and

conflictive, with the potential of diminishing the certainty and predictabillity of contract law"
(Larry A. DiMatteo and Chen Lei, Chinese Contract Law: Civil and Common Law Perspectives,
Cambridge University Press 2017, at 14). For Chinese company law, see Shen Wei, infra note
109, and for use by Chinese investors of offshore financial centers, see Jason Sharman, Chinese
capitalflows and offshore financial centers, 25(3) The Pacific Review 317 (arguing that Chinese
investors "avail themselves of efficient institutions in offshore centers that are absent locally", at
317). For the weaknesses of Russian private law generally, see Nougayrede, supra note 107.
109. Shen Wei, China'sDilemma: How Can a Weak Company Law Regime Support a Strong Market
for International Private Equity Investments? A Real 'Piggybacking' Case 11(3) Bus. L.
195 224 (2010); Nougayrede, supra note 107.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

INT'L

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
348

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 52, NO.2

attempting to become a generalist center. The same is true for Cyprus,
which for two decades was the platform of choice for investors from the
former Soviet bloc.
These EU providers of incorporation services face global competition
from many rivals, amongst which are British overseas territories such as the
British Virgin Islands (a generalist center), the Cayman Islands (investment
funds, listing vehicles and structured finance) and Bermuda (insurance
companies), as well as Asian centers in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Mauritius, for its part has sought to specialize as a gateway to India and
Africa. The main users of many of these hubs are investors from emerging
economies: between 2010 and 2016, 65% of investment flows into the BVI
and Cayman Islands came from Hong Kong, mainland China, Russia and
Brazil. 110 In all these hub jurisdictions, company law is a cornerstone of
export-oriented strategies for domestic development and growth."' The
global incorporation market has given rise to national professional classes of
administrators and service providers whose clear interest is to promote and
preserve the competitive success of their national law when compared to that
of other hubs.112 In Singapore, even the textbooks proclaim the aspiration
3
that Singapore "become the place of incorporation of choice in Asia.""1
While Delaware is often considered to be an important participant in this
global market, its position is arguably different from other incorporation
jurisdictions, because of the fact that it is part of the federal US system.
Delaware developed early on as an incorporation hub for US businesses
(replacing New Jersey, as is well known); the case can be made that its main
110. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 5, at 20.
111. For an account of these strategies, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER R. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING
OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING
FINANCIAL WORLD (1st ed. 2016), and see also the book review by William J. Moon, Tax
Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH.L. REV. 1081 (2018) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER
M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS
IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD (2016). Bruner adopts a sanguine position on these
strategies and argues (as do others) that successful incorporation hubs should be viewed as
useful laboratories of legal innovation. He writes that "[c]harged labels such as "tax haven" and
"offshore financial center" tend to obscure both the value provided by such jurisdictions and the
degree to which major economic powers engage in the very practices for which they criticize
their smaller competitors." (221). For a comparative review of other scholars' views of the role
of offshore jurisdictions in the global economy, see Delphine Nougayrede, The Use of Offshore
Companies in EmergingMarket Economies: A Case Study, 23 COLUM. J. OF EUR. L. 401 (2017).

112. On the contribution of corporate lawyers to the creation of the Cayman financial center,

see Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morris, CreatingCayman as an Offshore FinancialCenter: Structure
&Strategy Since 1960, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1297 (2013).
113. Regarding Singapore, commentators write that "[t]he legislative and regulatory
philosophy [of Singapore law being] clearly one that is market-friendly and responsive,"
Singapore will "perhaps [...]
also become the place of incorporation of choice in Asia." HANS
& LEE PEY WOAN, CORPORATE LAW iv-vii (1st ed. 2015). See Vincent Ooi
& Tan Cheng Han, A Relationship of ReciprocalInfluence: Singapore Company Law and the Economy
3 (Nat'l Univ. of Sing., Working Paper No. 001, 2018), https://law.nus.edu.sg/wps/pdfs/0012018_Tano20Chengo20Han.pdf.
TJIo, PEARLY KOH

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2019]

AFTER THE PANAMA PAPERS

349

objective was always to attract incorporations from elsewhere within the US,
rather than from outside the US even when they are owned by foreigners,
Delaware legal entities are at all times under the shadow of powerful federal
US enforcement bodies, such as the IRS, OFAC, the US Department of
Justice or the SEC. In contrast, no such shadow is cast by the enforcement
agencies of non-US incorporation hubs, even within the EU where these
bodies remain largely national. This is a circumstance that makes a practical
difference for persons seeking to use Delaware primarily as a secrecy haven.
What is important for the purpose of this article, more generally, is that for
all of these incorporation hubs, the incorporation theory must remain the
prevailing global paradigm. It is central to the very existence of the market
for incorporation services and to the success of national development
strategies that have latched onto it.
Within the continental European Union, there has been significant
scholarly debate on this evolution of private international law. Perhaps
4
unsurprisingly, the critics have often been French or German." Most
French commentators have seen in the Centros jurisprudence the seeds of a
race to the bottom,", while attempts at EU-wide imposition of the
incorporation theory by way of directive were bluntly opposed by a French
parliamentary report on the argument that the rule would lead to forum
shopping and third party legal insecurity.116 One German scholar implicitely
defended the real seat doctrine by highlighting its historical insertion into a
wider political and economic system, and its role in establishing a "level
playing field" with regard to protection of all stakeholders: "obviously, states
that recognize a political, or even a constitutional, need to protect certain
interests (such as the interests of minority shareholders, employees, creditors
or other stakeholders, especially in the context of large publicly-held

114. There have admittedly been a few US or UK defenders of corporate "bio-diversity" as
well. See, e.g, Nicholas H.D. Foster & Jane Ball, Imperialism and Accountability in CorporateLaw:

the Limitations of IncorporationLaw as a Regulatory Mechanism, in 2 GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE AND

THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,

(Sorcha McLeod

& Roger Brownsworth, eds., 2006) ("in a straight contest between common law and the more
protective type of civilian law attitude, the common law has a distinct advantage. Add to this
the predominance of United States (and, to a lesser extent, English/UK) ideas in legal
globalisation, and the existence of micro-states eager to cash in on any opportunity to gain
registration income, legal-organisational bio-diversity seems threatened, as does the long-term
survival of a stricter corporate regulatory regime.").
115. The "race to the bottom" risk is at least implicitely endorsed by Pierre Mayer and Vincent
Heuze (Droit International Prive, LGDJ 11 th edition 2014, at 731) as well as by Dominique
Bureau and Horatia Muir Watt (Droit International Prive, PUF 3rd edition 2014, at 466).
116. Christian Gaudin, Senat, Rapport d'information fait au nom de la mission commune
d'information sur la notion de centre de decision economique et les consequences qui
s'attachent, en ce domaine, a l'attractivite du territoire national - Tome I : rapport (2007) (FR.);
see at https://www.senat.fr/rap/r06-347-1/rO6-347-1105.html.
The report pointed out,
however, that member states such as Germany and the Netherlands as well as many large
French corporations seemed favorable to this type of reform. Id.
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corporations) will favor the real seat doctrine." 117 Another German scholar
worried that the ECJ's case law would endanger the famed German worker
co-determination model, which is built into its corporate law,"' and noted
regretfully that "[t]he ECJ could equally have adopted an approach that
deferred to the Member State's judgment of how best to regulate socioeconomic affairs in their territories.",1 9 There was even a pointed critique
by an Austrian (and US) scholar as to whether the ECJ's jurisprudence was
even intentional: "Did the Court intend this result? It is unlikely, given its
relatively limited understanding of business law policies."120 Even if not
expressly articulated as such, this seems like a remarkable indictment of ECJ
decision making in the field.
Despite all of these concerns, it does not seem that the Centros line of
decisions has led to a European Delaware or Nevada, in the sense that EU
businesses are not rushing to incorporate their companies in another
member state rather than at home.121 The main fallout has, instead, been a
series of national corporate reforms to introduce more competitive domestic
statutes and a general reduction in minimum charter capital requirements;
this latter development has been welcomed by some commentators as a
"change in culture for paternalistic Continental European models,"122 but
considered by others to reflect a race to the bottom.23 A larger area of
concern, however, shouldperhaps be elsewhere, i.e. in the decision of some
of the smaller EU states to become incorporation platforms not for other
EU investors, but for non-EU investors as an entry point into the entire EU.
Instead of a "Delaware syndrome," this might be referred to as the European
"Trojan Horse syndrome." Under EU rules now standing, all EU states
must unconditionally recognize the legal personality of a Cyprus or Maltese
117. Ebke, supra note 71, at 1028. Yet while 'Werner Ebke's article is a ringing endorsement of
the powerful internal logic of the real seat theory, he nevertheless seems anxious not to be seen
as "promoting" or "defending" it. Id. at 1017.

118.

JUSTIN BORG-BARTHET, THE GOVERNING LAW OF COMPANIES IN

EU

LAW

161 (2012).

119. Id.139-140.
120. Martin Gelter, Centros, the Freedom of Establishmentfor Companies, and the Court'sAccidental

Vision for Corporate Law (February 13, 2015), in EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND
309,337 (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies,

CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE

eds., 2017).
121. Andrea Zorzi, supra note 20 at 256 (2017). The country perhaps best placed to win a race
to become the preferred EU center for incorporation would have been the UK, but in recent
years it did not seem interested to play this role, a series of reforms having reinforced the antiabuse contents of its corporate law (for example the removal of corporate directorships,
reinforcement of concept of shadow director and creation of a fully public register of beneficial
owners). See BORG-BARTHET, supra note 118, at 83-84. The question may at any rate be moot
following the UK's decision to leave the EU.
122. Gelter, supra note 120, at 335.
123. GUNTHER H. ROTH & PETER KINDLER, THE SPIRIT OF CORPORATE LAW
CORE
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE LAW IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE;

at 20 (2013) ('agradual

convergence of private limited company laws on the initiative of Member States may be noted
due to increased competitive pressures and this in the form of downward spiral ("race to the

bottom"). For example this may be seen in the downward adjustment of corporate capital').
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registered company when the company is validly formed under Cypriot or
Maltese law (typically an easy standard), even if its shareholders are all nonCypriot, non-Maltese or non-EU, if it has no substance in Cyprus or Malta
other than a registered address and if its principal activity is conducted
entirely outside of Cyprus or Malta.124 Nor should these two countries be
singled out: the same problem exists in other more established EU
incorporation platforms as well, such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg or
Ireland.
To be fair, it must be recognized that this is not only about corporate laws
or the private international law of companies. The complete EU picture
must also include the tax dimension. Even if the ECJ's doctrine on
corporate recognition was really "accidental,"125 the emergence of a market
for EU incorporation services to non-EU investors really took off the way it
did because of long-standing European failure to harmonize corporate
income taxes and outbound withholding taxes on payments to non-EU
investors. In the US, in contrast, federal taxation rules ensure significant
commonality across the fifty states, and outbound withholding taxes are
federal and therefore apply indistinctly. In the EU, there is no "federal"
corporate income tax and each member state sets its own outbound
withholding taxes: member states that wish to attract non-EU investors are
free to remove such withholding taxes entirely.126 Therefore, the demise of
the real seat theory is only part of the overall European picture.
Luxembourg is a real seat country (at least on paper). Yet, it has been very
successful as an incorporation platform for non-EU investors, because of its
124. For example, in France, CA Rennes 24 April 2002 concerning a Cypriot "single ship"
company. The court listed the following circumstances as justifying that the company was not
fictitious : it had been registered in Cyprus prior to the factual circumstances under dispute, its
shareholders were designated physical persons, it had its own assets (a vessel under Cypriot
flag), the vessel was managed by a specialized service company, it had entered into insurance
and charterparty agreements and had prepared financial statements subject to audit by a
reputable international firm. But see Cour de Cassation, Com. [Court of Cassation,
Commercial Division] Jun. 22, 1999, Bulletin 1999 IV N' 136 p. 113 (concerning a Cypriot
single ship company that was ruled to be fictitious: the reasons were that it was wholly owned by
its shareholder (a Russian company) save for 0.01% owned by a Cypriot nominee (a legal
secretary), which represented an insignificant amount of charter capital, the company had no
"structure for its operations," its bareboat charter activity had no reality and the company was
formed only to provide security to a lending bank. But the court also ruled that fictitiousness
could not retroact). On this second case, see Alexis Constantin, Conditions et effets de lafictivit
d'une societe, commentary on Cass. Com. 22 June 1999, Revue des societes 824-841 (1999).
125. Gelter, supra note 120, at 309.
126. Moves against overly favorable corporate income tax rules (and rulings) in individual EU
member states are now under way, on the basis not of taxation rules but of competition rules
prohibiting state aid (the Apple case is a prominent example). Withholding taxes on dividends,
royalties and interest paid to non-EU recipients, however, still seem quite immune to
harmonization and continue to be decided by each member state individually (and bilaterally in
tax treaties with non-EU countries), and this despite reported attempts by the EU commission
to introduce minimum EU-wide standards (see for example Joe Kirwin, EUpushes measures to
tax outbound royalty, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eu-pushes-measuresn57982078129/.
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favorable tax laws, network of tax treaties, and perhaps also because of its
127
pragmatic approach to the actual physical presence required at the seat.
Compared with the US, this EU failure to formulate corporate recognition
policies that would take proper account of the tax competition taking place
between member states seems both short-sighted and naive.
E.

THE EVOLUTION OF THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION

Yet another contributive factor to the success of shell companies as a
global phenomenon is the rise of contractarian theories of the firm. A
century ago, "theories of the corporation" were hotly debated by scholars.128
The question was whether corporations were natural entities with corporeal
substance pre-existing legal personality that should be recognized by the law
(the "natural" or "real entity" theory),129 or whether corporations were legal
fictions to which personhood was conferred through a discretionary
concession or grant by the state (the "concession", "grant" or "fiction"
theory).30 At present, the question seems much less relevant. To paraphrase
127. Per the OECD the total stock of global incoming FDI into Luxembourg in 2017 was
3.988 trillion USD (directional principle), out of which a full 3.809 trillion was transit FDI
through SPEs. See FDI Flows by Industry OECD.STAT (06 Mar. 2019, 2:32 UTC), https://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDIFLOWINDUSTRY
(FDI positions, main
aggregates BMD4, directional principle: inward). Another expression is FDI as a proportion of
GDP: in 2015, Luxembourg's share of the OECD total inward FDI stock (1.4%) dwarfed its
share of GDP (0.1%). See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD], Luxembourg: Trade and StatisticalNote, at 2 (2017), http://www.oecd.org/investment/
LUXEMBOURG-trade-investment-statistical-country-note.pdf.
Luxembourg's pragmatic
approach to its own real seat requirement seems confirmed by the Polbub case regarding the
(valid) transfer of a Polish company's registered office to Luxembourg without transferring its
real head office which remained in Poland (CJEU Case C-106/16, Polbud Wykonawstwo sp. zoo,
Oct. 25, 2017, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-10/cpl70112en
.pdf).
128. For recent summaries of the main theories and past debates, see Nicholas H.D. Foster,
Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France, 48 Am. J. CoMP. L. 573,
(2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic
Development: Comment on the Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories, 63 WASH. & LEE 1489 (2006); Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm
From Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2013); and Susan Mary Watson, The
Corporate Legal Person, J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2018).
129. Watson, supra note 128, at 12. This was the theory of German scholar Otto van Gierke.
As explained by Watson, van Gierke
argued that the real and social existence of a group makes it a legal person rather
than the state. As such, the corporation was not created by the law, but pre-legal or
extra-legal. Even though the law did not create the corporation, Gierke argued that
it was bound to recognise its existence.
Id.
130. Id. at 2. The origins of this theory were found in medieval practice in Italy. It was
considered to have died away when general incorporation statutes (which removed the state's
discretionary element) were adopted in the 19th century. Watson makes the convincing
argument, however, that the concession theory is the most appropriate to explain the modern
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the words of an English scholar, most would agree that "a favorite word in
discussions of company law theory or legal personality is 'metaphysical,'
which seems to be a euphemism for 'useless waste of time.'' 13 1 If any
corporate theory can be said to enjoy serious attention in academic
scholarship today, it is the contractarian interpretation of the firm as a
"nexus of contracts" (or "nexusfor contracts") which grew out of the law and
economics movement. According to this view, the main function of
corporate law is to facilitate economic activity through "entity shielding"
and "asset partitioning": the segregation of assets to serve as security for
creditors of the company rather than those of the owners, together with
procedural benefits in the form of single authority to sign contracts and
obtain separate legal standing in court. 132 This is a theory chiefly concerned
with attention to transaction costs and optimal, growth-enhancing allocation
of resources, which views corporations as an expanded sort of contract
exercising its effects vis-4-vis third parties. None of this requires paying
attention to the human or physical dimension of a company's existence. The
fact that the corporation has legal personality is viewed merely as a
"convenient heuristic formula for describing organizational forms which
enjoy the benefit" of the three "foundational rules," (i.e., entity shielding,
single authority and standing in court). 133 The law and economics literature
on corporations having been uninterested in legal personality as an
institution,134 it is not surprising that the same lack of interest would extend
to questions governing its international recognition. A contractarian theory
of the firm will naturally accord the same deference towards private
corporate ordering that is accorded in the area of contract. Respect for party
autonomy is indeed fundamental in contract, i.e. parties must be free to
determine their contractual commitments and their legitimate expectations
must be upheld. As critical scholars have written, these are absolute
bedrocks of international economic order premised on the need for legal
predictability and couched in terms that are both "technical and
necessitarian."135 A corporate theory of the contractarian kind will be loath
corporation. This would certainly seem consistent with the international rise of the
incorporation theory in private international law.
131. Foster, supra note 128, at 588.
132. The seminal work is REINIER KRAAxAN, PAUL DAVIES, HENRY HANSMANN, GERARD
HERTIG, KLALs HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE

ed. 2017).
133. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The Essential Elements of Corporate
Law 9-10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 134, 2009), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1436551. The authors add that "although it is common in
the legal literature to extend syllogistic deduction from the premise of legal personality to the
existence of characteristics beyond the three foundational features [...], we see no functional
rationale that compels this."
134. DEREK FRENCH, STEPHEN W. MAYSON & CHRISTOPHER L. RYAN, COMPANY LAW 156
(3 1st ed. 2015); Watson, supra note 128, at 2.
13 5. Robert Wai, TransnationalLiftoff andjuridicalTouchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private
InternationalLaw in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 229 (2002). For
another critique of party autonomy, see Horatia Muir Watt, Party Autonomy in International
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d
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to question, let alone defeat the choice of investors to form or own a shell
company in one jurisdiction rather than another. At the other end of the
spectrum is the traditional continental European system of corporate law.
This system sought to internalize third party protection into the very body
of corporate law and "attach[ed] importance to a high level of mandatory law
in order to provide effective legal protection for al interests involved" (not
just shareholders), therefore demanding "of their domestic enterprises that
they subject themselves to national laws using a company form under
domestic law."136 For decades this continental European corporate law
system co-existed alongside contract laws themselves fully respectful of party
autonomy. One fails to see why these two separate disciplines should
necessarily be fused into one and why an institutional theory of the
corporation cannot continue to co-exist alongside and separately from
contract laws.
To this day, the influence of contractarian approaches to corporations
continues to be visible in European private international law doctrine.
Scholarly suggestions are that the incorporation theory should become the
object of a new EU regulation ("Rome V"), with the twin goals of (yet)
further reduction of transaction costs and further enhancement of legal
certainty.137 For the scholars formulating this proposal, the real seat
connecting factor is simply too uncertain: "Member States differ in their
definitions of the real seat, and past experience with a real-seat-type
connecting factor used by the Insolvency Regulation (the center of main
interests/COMI) has given rise to a considerable amount of litigation and,
accordingly, a high degree of legal uncertainty." Yet, at the same time, the
authors acknowledge that "there is a strong policy desire on the part of the
Member States to retain at least some control over foreign companies
operating within their territory." 138 Their technical proposal to reconcile
these two objectives is a carve-out allowing "overriding mandatory
provisions" to prevail over the law of incorporation.39 "Overriding
mandatory provisions" in the European system are "provisions the respect
for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public
interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, to such an
extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope,
'
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable."140
On the face of it, this looks
like an elegant solution respectful of national specificity. The difficulty,
however, is that "overriding mandatory provisions" have not been very
Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the Requirements of Global Governance 6 EUR.
CONT.

REV. OF

L. 250 (2010).

136. ROTH & KINDLER, supra note 123, at 1023-27 (2013) (emphasis added).
137. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Frederico M. Mucciarelli, Edmund-Philip Schuster & Mathias
M. Siems, STUDY ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO COMPANIES, EUROPEAN COMM'N, at 294
(2016).
138. Id. at 327.
139. Id. at 330.
140. Commission Regulation 593/2008 of June 17, 2008, On the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 9(1) (2).
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successful as an institution to date. They are difficult to identify, suffer from
lack of consensus and may represent an impracticably high standard. There
are very few precedents of these rules having been deployed in cross-border
settings to defeat party autonomy. 141 Setting aside the question of
"overriding mandatory provisions" however, the general point is that
scholarly reasoning in the private international law of corporations now
displays levels of natural deference towards party autonomy that are similar
to those traditionally afforded to contracts. This reasoning does not place
any methodological emphasis on the institutional dimension of corporations,
or on how the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders or
contractual creditors, not to mention the wider public, might also be
protected.
IV.

The Dilution of Substantive Corporate Law Standards

All these combined evolutions form the backdrop of the global success of
the shell company as an institution. In parallel, the global market in
incorporation services has contributed to the dilution of certain substantive
standards originally thought to be embedded in the corporation seen as an
institution. I propose to illustrate this through two examples only (without
claiming to be exhaustive): first, the advent of strict confidentiality rules
limiting access to corporate information, and second, the deconstruction of
corporate administration and transformation of the office of director with
attendant dilution of fiduciary duties. The paramount advantage achieved
by legal systems from these techniques has been to keep the cost of
corporate services to a minimum, which helps to buttress positions in the
global market for incorporations.
A.

CORPORATE CONFIDENTIALITY

As early as 1968, the first EU company law directive set forth the principle
of public disclosure of the "personal data" of all companies.142 The directive
required the publication of the articles or charter of the company, names of
directors or board members, powers of these officers to bind the company,
and annual accounts of the company. 4 3 The reason underpinning these
141. One of the difficulties is that the "overriding mandatory rules" that must be recognized by
courts are those of the forum state, which in questions of corporate constitution and governance
will be the state of incorporation. True protection would require recognizing the "overriding
mandatory rules" of a third country, for which consideration by courts is both discretionary and
infrequent (See Delphine Nougayrede, TNK-BP, Party Autonomy and Third Country Mandatory
Rules, 35 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus AMBASSADOR IA,1 (2015).
142. First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 Oj. Spec. Ed. 41, 41 (EC).

143. See id. ("on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of
members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the

second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent
throughout the Community."). For smaller closely held companies the obligation to publish
the annual balance sheet and profit and loss account was deferred until the Fourth Directive on
annual accounts. See Fourth Council Directive 82/891, 1978 Oj. (L 221) 1, 1 (EC).
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disclosure obligations was the imperative of creditor protection. 144 These
were the European standards of transparency as far back as 1968; the
standards have expanded since then-the most recent expansion being
mandatory beneficial owner identification in registers that are expected to
14
become public.
In contrast to these European standards, which are applied in all member
states including the European incorporation hubs of the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Cyprus or Malta, the corporate disclosure standards of most
non-EU incorporation hubs have long been minimal. In the traditional
offshore jurisdictions, the principle of confidentiality was a cornerstone
policy and continues to be forcefully defended to this day, 146 albeit with
recent temperaments. In the BVI, for example, information available for
public inspection is traditionally limited to the certificate of incorporation,
the memorandum and articles (which are usually standard form documents),
address of the registered office, amount of government fees paid, any notices
of winding up or liquidation, and the register of charges.' 47 The share
144. See First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 OJ. Spec. Ed. 41, 41 (EC).
145. Disclosure obligations regarding financial information were set out in 1978 by the Fourth
Company Directive of 1978. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 143. These obligations were
then replaced in 2013 by Directive 2013/34/EU. See Directive 2013/04, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual Financial Statements,
Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings,
Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, 2013 OJ. (L 182) 1 (EU). In
2015, the Fourth Money Laundering Directive required EU companies to look through
successive tiers of shareholders to identify and record physical ultimate beneficial owners
owning more than a certain threshold (25% or less depending on the country), but only a few
countries decided that that they would publicly disclose these beneficial owner registers. See
Directive 2015/849, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or
Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2015 OJ. (L 141) 1 (EU). A fifth anti-money
laundering directive has just been adopted that requires public disclosure of all beneficial owner
registers, See Directive 2018/843, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May
2018 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money
Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, and Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2018 OJ. (L 141) 1.
The speed of implementation by EU member states of these new measures is, admittedly,
problematic. At the time of writing (September 2018) only 8 or so states seemed to be in full
compliance, and they did not include major incorporation hubs such as the Netherlands,
Cyprus or Malta.
146. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 3 4
(2014).
147. CHRISTOPHER BICKLEY, BERMUDA, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS
COMPANY LAW 55-56 (4th ed. 2013); Carey Olsen, Continuing Requirements for British Virgin

Island Companies,

OFFSHORE LAW SPECIALISTS

(2017), https://www.careyolsen.com/sites/de

fault/files/CO BVI CORPContinuing%20Requirements%20for%20BVI%20Companies%2
OKL_3%2017%20%282%29.pdf.
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register disclosing the names of the shareholders and register of directors are
available for inspection only if the company has elected to have them filed at
the BVI registrar of companies; only a very small fraction of companies
incorporated in the territory have chosen to do so, however.148 In some
cases BVI courts even prevent disclosure of the share register to minority
shareholders. 149 The Cayman Islands offer still less public disclosure: it is
limited to the registered name of the company, its date of incorporation,
registration number, address of the registered office and the type of
company. 50 Shareholder and director identity remain shielded from public
scrutiny, as do any financial statements. This is very fundamentally different
from the regime that has existed for five decades in the European Union.
Following international pressure, many offshore jurisdictions have now
agreed to introduce beneficial owner registers, i.e. the names of
shareholders, beneficial owners and directors will progressively be made
available to local registrars and law enforcement agencies (and from there
should become subject to international exchange in accordance with
intergovernmental agreements).'5' These reforms do not affect the position
of "horizontal" private law creditors or counterparties, however, who do not
gain any additional rights of information in the process. 52 Minimal
standards of disclosure are evidently advantageous for shell company
administration, for they enable to keep the costs of maintaining the
structures to a very low amount. The preservation of confidentiality is
148. According to the OECD (2013), total existing incorporations in the territory were
850,000. During the period 2010-2012 only 2% of the circa 200,000 newly registered
companies elected to have their register of members maintained at the BVI registrar. OECD,
Global Forum on Transparencyand Exchangee of Information for Tax Purposes, Peer Review Report
Phase 2, Implementation of the Standard in Practice, Virgin Islands (British), 65 (2013).
149. BELLE ANTOINE, supra note 146, at T 2.16 ("what is intriguing is that the court protected
the confidentiality of the share register even to the extent of denying access to a shareholder
engaged in litigation against the sole director and majority shareholder"); Harneys, Shareholder
Activism: Considerationsfor BVI Companies, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=52f6de27-6daO-4e1 8-9378-ecfc571aa293.
150. BICKLEY, supra note 147, at 78 -79; see Comparison of Laws in Bermuda, Cayman Islands and
British Virgin Islands Relating to Offshore Companies, CONYERS DILL & PEARMAN (2009), https://
www.conyersdill.com/publication-files/PubMulti-Comp-LawsBdaCayBVI.pdf.
151. Such registers were introduced by both the BVI and Cayman Islands amongst others.
Beneficial Ownership Secure Search System Act (2017) (BVI); Beneficial Ownership
(Companies) Regulations, (2017) (Cayman Islands) (These statutes do not require that the
information be made public, however). See Maintaining Beneficial Ownership Register Cayman
Islands and British Virgin Islands, ASiA LAW NETWORK (Sept. 16, 2018), http://learn.asialawnet
work.com/201 8/09/16/maintaining-beneficial-ownership-register- cayman-islands-and-britishvirgin-islands-bvi/.
152. There are exceptions. In Singapore, direct shareholders are now publicly accessible on the
Bizfile system of the registrar of companies. If they are nominees (which may frequently be the
case), they are not identified as such. Setting Up a PrivateLimited Company in Singapore, RIKVIN,
https://www.rikvin.com/incorporation/singapore-private -limited-company-registration/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2019). Singapore has also now enacted a register of beneficial owners
("controllers"), but it will not be public. Companies (Amendment) Act 2017, Acc. AND CORP.
REGULATORY AUTHORITY,

https://www.acra.gov.sg/CA 2017/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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viewed by many jurisdictions as central to their competitive position,
particularly vis-a-vis Asian centers, and they have actively resisted pressure
to lift their standards. 1 3 But even if local disclosure standards were to be
raised, there are serious questions as to the quality of information that might
be elicited from the local agents. This is connected to the frequent
deconstruction of corporate administration that has occurred in many of
these jurisdictions, to which I will turn in the following section.
Before doing so, however, it is important to say a few words on the
position of the United States in this debate on corporate disclosure. In terms
of public access to information, US incorporation hubs such as Delaware or
Nevada are aligned more with traditional regimes in jurisdictions like the
Cayman Islands or BVI than with the European hubs. Delaware
incorporation requires disclosure only of a local registered agent; not only is
there is no public disclosure of directors or shareholders, but the mere idea
of mandatory identification of ultimate beneficial owners (not to mention
disclosure) has been successfully resisted for years. 154 The main explanation
for this resistance is that state bodies that maintain corporate registers view
beneficial owner identification not as a matter of state law but as a federal
matter that should be the responsibility of agencies such as the US
Treasury.55 Following international pressure, piecemeal federal measures
were progressively introduced in recent years, which require ultimate
beneficial owner identification in certain tax filings, including for foreign
owned entities that do not conduct any activity in the US,156 and also for
entities that purchase high end real estate in US counties viewed as prime
destinations for money laundering. 57 But this piecemeal approach driven by
153. A May 2018 vote by the UK Parliament requiring the overseas territories to make public
their registers of beneficial owners (as is already in the case in the UK) elicited violent
objections in most of these territories. See, e.g., Patrick YVintour, British Overseas Territories in
Talks to Keep Tax Haven Secrecy, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/jun/13/british-overseas-territories-in-talks-to-keep-tax-haven-secrecy.
154. The most recent attempts at US federal legislation are TITLE Act, S. 1454, 115th Cong.
(2017) in the Senate, and the Corporate Transparency Act, S. 1717, 115th Cong. (2017) and
Corporate Transparency Act, H.R. 3089, 115th Cong. (2017) in both Senate and House. S.
516, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1717, 115th Cong. (2017); H. J. Res. 3089, 115th Cong. (2017). All
previous attempts at federal or state legislation were unsuccessful.
155. See State Incorporation Collection of Company Ownership Info, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECRETARIES
OF
STATE,
https://www.nass.org/initiatives/state-incorporation-collectioncompany-ownership-info (last visited January 27, 2019) (discussing company ownership).
156. Treatment of Certain Domestic Entities Disregarded as Separate From Their Owners as
Corporations for Purposes of Section 6038A, 81 Fed. Reg. 239, 89849 (Dec. 13, 2016) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1,301).
157. FinCen Geographical Targeting Orders for the five boroughs of New York City, MiamiDade County, Broward County, Palm Beach County, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Antonio,
San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara. These orders require title insurance companies to
identify beneficial owners beyond a certain acquisition threshold. U.S. Title Insurers Required to

Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Jul. 27, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincenexpands -reach-real -estate -geographic-targeting-orders-beyond-manhattan.
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federal enforcement agencies falls short of general beneficial owner
identification for all US registered companies and corporations, so in this
field the US is still lagging behind best practices.18 Regrettably, the ABA
has played a central role in the resistance against corporate transparency, on
the argument that the proposed measures would undermine client-attorney
privilege and place an unnecessary burden on corporate formation by US
small businesses. 1 9
B.

THE DECONSTRUCTION OF CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION AND

DILUTION OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
One of the more harmful evolutions of substantive corporate law in many
incorporation hubs, especially the traditional offshore ones, is the
deconstruction of corporate administration among multiple service
providers, "registered agents" and "nominee" shareholders or directors.
Jurisdictions wishing to successfully market incorporation services to nonresidents must try to host sufficient numbers of such service providers
(which are sometimes locally regulated, though not always), but many of the
functions can also be parceled out along what are global supply chains of
interlocking corporate administration services.160 The linchpin provider in
the jurisdiction of incorporation is always the "registered agent," but the role
of these local participants can be quite minimal and limited to providing a
legal address and keeping copies of a few documents.161 The more valueadded services, such as the provision of nominee directors or nominee
shareholders, can be procured from other services providers in other
countries instead (usually also incorporation hubs). The minimal role of
registered agents lowers local incorporation costs, but it also leads to
158. Another reproach often formulated against the US is that it is not a party to any of the
multilateral or bilateral treaty arrangements for reciprocal exchange of account information
spearheaded by the OECD since 2013 (i.e. it receives information from abroad but does not
send any out). The critique is not entirely accurate as some of the FATCA intergovernmental
treaties, in particular IGA Model 1, provide for reciprocal exchange. ERIKA LUNDER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43444, REPORTING FOREIGN FINANcIAL ASSETS UNDER TITLES 26 AND
31: FATCA AND FBAR 12 (2014).
159. See Letter from Hilarie Bass, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Senate Comm. on Judiciary
(Feb. 1, 2018) (and for a full exposition of the ABA's views against "Gatekeeper Regulations on
Lawyers" that the proposed legislation would according to them involve, visit https://www
.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental-legislative-work/priorities-policy/independence of
the-legal-profession/bank secrecy-act/.). As an aside, the circumstance that all US entities are
under the shadow of powerful federal enforcement agencies does not justify, in this author's
view, the US exempting itself from recognized international best standards.
160. For an extreme example of such practices by Kazakh businessman Mukhtar Ablyazov, see
Delphine Nougayrede, The Use of Offshore Companies in Emerging Market Economies: A Case
Study, 23(2) COLLM. J. EUR. L. 401, 409 15 (2017).
161. See, e.g., IMF, British Virgin Islands: Financial Sector Assessment Program Update
Documentation Technical Note on Corporateand Trust Services Providers, Country Report No. 10/
326, at 5 (Oct. 2010), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/crIO326.pdf (regarding
the BVI).
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minimization of local knowledge regarding the activities that are actually
conducted by the company, allowing heads to remain in the sand and
obstacles to be raised against verification of information and effective
regulation by local regulators.
The directors, according to standard corporate theory, should be the key
agents of internal control over the company. But, in many jurisdictions,
directors' fiduciaries duties are now significantly curtailed through the
operation of indemnities. Wide director indemnification is of central
importance to jurisdictions that practice incorporation services as an export,
again with the paramount objective of keeping the costs down. Intriguingly,
the corporate law of these jurisdictions is seldom transparent about the
resulting dilution of actual director liability. Given prevailing standards of
confidentiality, judgments in this area are hard to come by, which is why a
recent Singaporean illustration is of special interest.162 The case involved
two nominee Singaporean directors who, despite having signed various lossmaking transactions, were found not to have been in breach of their duty to
exercise due care and skill.163 Their defense rested on "Nominee Director
Indemnity Agreements" under which their roles would be purely routine and
administrative, and which ensured that they would not "act in any executive
capacity or undertakes[sic] any commercial decisions or assume any
commercial responsibility."164 Yet when one examines a leading textbook on
Singapore corporate law and its chapter on fiduciary duties, there is no
mention of the position of "nominee" directors, nor of the effectiveness of
contractual instruments that might entirely void fiduciary duties that, on the
books at least, appear to be fairly standard in scope. 65 Director
indemnification is not per se abnormal, of course, and it is allowed in a
number of onshore countries: the real question, however, is one of degree.
There must be a balance between the protection reasonable persons will
require before accepting a position of responsibility, and the need to ensure
that these individuals will act responsibly and seek sufficient knowledge
about the activities of the company. 66 National legal systems accept
different thresholds of exclusion from director indemnification, which may
vary from simple negligence (i.e. directors remain "on the hook" for simple

162. Prima Bulkship Pte Ltd v Lim Say Wan, [2016] SGHC 283, at 4 (Sing.).
163. Id. at 1-4.
164. Id. at 11-12.
165. HANS Tjio, PEARLY KOH &

LEE PEY WOAN, CORPORATE LAW

may change in the next edition following the Prima judgment.
166. On this theme in a US context, see ROBERT A. RAGAzzo

iv-vii
(1st ed. 2015). This

AND

DoUGLAS K. MOLL,

PROBLEMS
544
(Thomson West, 2006) ("the fundamental issue that must be addressed by an indemnification
statute is the establishment of policies consistent with these broad principles: to ensure that
indemnification is permitted only when it will further sound corporate policies and to prohibit
indemnification when it might protect or encourage wrongful or improper conduct.").
CLOSELY
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7
negligence) all the way to a much higher threshold of dishonesty or fraud.16
The higher the exclusion threshold, the more directors are protected from
liability. Offshore jurisdictions characteristically have high exclusion
thresholds. Bermudan company law, for example, was specifically amended
in 1996 to allow indemnification in all cases not reaching the high threshold
of fraud or dishonesty (the previous threshold, of willful negligence, was
much lower).168 As a result, commentators were able to report in 2014 that
"there have been no reported directors' liability decisions from the Bermuda
courts since 1996."169 In contrast, indemnification granted to directors in
onshore jurisdictions is much narrower, and directors in companies
registered in those jurisdictions therefore have greater incentive to exercise
actual control or supervision over corporate activities.
Yet another characteristic often found in offshore jurisdictions, also
central to shell company administration, is the institution of corporate
directors (i.e. legal entities as directors as opposed to natural persons). The
point of such structures is to insert additional layers of limited liability:
fiduciary liability is borne by a company with limited assets itself, and in turn
its shareholders also enjoy limited liability. The natural persons carrying out
administration tasks do not bear any personal fiduciary duty of their own,
because they work as employees of the corporate director, and their names
need not appear on any of the corporate documentation. Continental
jurisdictions such as France or Germany have never allowed this type of
institution. In the UK, corporate directorships used to exist but were
specifically disallowed in 2015; 17 0 the reason put forward was precisely to
"deter opaque arrangements involving company directors and increase
accountability where they are used to no good end.' 171 Other European
countries that serve as incorporation hubs still retain the institution,
however: this is true of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus or Malta.
The institution also continues to exist in many US states.
To summarize therefore, shell companies are often associated with various
institutional characteristics in the corporate law that explain why they are so
easy to manipulate: minimal publicly disclosed information, deconstructed
corporate administration between numerous intermediaries none of which
has full oversight over corporate activities, professional nominee directors or

167. For a practitioner-oriented summary of director indemnification in different countries, see
A CROSS-BORDER GUIDE FOR GROUP COMPANY DIRECTORS 98 (Jul. 2014),

LINKLATERS,

www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/brussels/Directors-Cross-Border-Guide.pdf.
168. Companies Amendment Act 21, § 98(b) (1996) (Berm.).
169. John Riihiluoma, Directors'Liability in Bermuda: An Overview, in OFFSHORE COMMERCIAL
19.8.1 8.2 (Ian R.C. Kawley ed., 2014). The author adds, however, that

LAW IN BERMUDA,

directors of Bermudan companies listed in foreign exchanges are under risk of being sued in
those jurisdictions. Id. A more recent edition (2018) reports one decision on directors' liability.
170. Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26, § 87, sch. 3 (UK).
171.

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, SMALL BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND

EMPLOYMENT ACT: COMPANIES: TRANSPARENCY

4 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/

uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/417328/bis 15 266 SBEE Act companiestransparency- fact-sheet.pdf.
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officers benefitting from significant indemnity protection, corporations as
directors. Such characteristics allow evisceration of the supervisory function
that traditional corporate theory would normally expect from the corporate
organs and local regulators. Unsurprisingly, the fact that such structures
would at the same time benefit from default international recognition seems
to many like an affront to common sense. 172
V.

What Can Be Done?

As was mentioned in the introduction, the dominant policy trend to
control the abuse of shell companies internationally is to create new stores of
information, in the form of domestic corporate registers of beneficial
ownership and international exchange of account information. With some
exceptions, however, this information will not become publicly accessible
and will be reserved to regulators and law enforcement. In the private law
sphere, as was explained in Section 2, contingent evolutions over recent
decades have progressively led to unconditional international recognition of
shell companies, as of all companies. This is a powerful evolution for which
systemic reversal seems unlikely. The question therefore is what
contribution private law safeguards might still be capable of offering in the
effort to curb abuse. The most ambitious route might well be to simply
align private international law recognition with the standards of
international tax law: if a shell company is treated as a CFC in the country of
its shareholders, then its legal personality would no longer be internationally
recognized either. Short of this nuclear option, however, other piecemeal
tools can perhaps be considered.
A.

Ex

ANTE CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS

For well-advised contractual counterparties (so-called "adjusting
creditors" in the law and economics literature), the best available response at
present is to avoid dealing with shell companies altogether. The next best
response, failing that, is to contractually replicate the protections that the
corporate institutional structure does not provide upfront. This means
making ultimate controllers-beneficial owners or parents-parties to
contracts, for example as guarantors, inserting provisions on the production
and sharing of financial statements during the duration of the contract,
asking to review and approve indemnification provisions applicable to
directors, full representations on the identity of the ultimate controllers or
beneficial owners (with an obligation to promptly notify of any change), and
the taking of registrable security on whatever assets of the company may
exist. Evidently, all this amounts to full externalization of risk management
costs that are entirely passed on to counterparties (who also have to pay their
own legal costs to perform due diligence and secure the necessary advice).
Weaker or less sophisticated counterparties may be unable to achieve
172. See supra note 13.
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sufficient protection, and such modes of protection are by definition entirely
unavailable to involuntary creditors such as tort victims or revenue
authorities.
B.

STATUTORY LIITATION OF RIGHTS

Another possible avenue are statutory limitations of the types of rights
that may be obtained by shell companies without human or physical
substance and that do not present adequate levels of transparency. Despite
globalization and rules on non-discrimination, it is still possible for legal
systems to statutorily introduce such restrictions. In the European Union,
for example, limitations of rights were proposed by members of the
European Parliament in the run-up to the adoption of the 5th Anti-Money
Laundering Directive. 173 Their proposal was that non-EU companies be
obliged to submit their beneficial ownership for inclusion into EU registers
whenever such companies sought to open a bank account, request a loan,
acquire real estate, or enter into any commercial transaction in the EU that
174
is dependent on a formality or validation act such as notarial certification.
Failure to comply with this transparency requirement would give rise to
"adequate sanctions," including "nullity of the contract."'175 In the UK, the
government has already announced legislation introducing a public register
176
of beneficial owners of foreign legal entities that own British real estate;
this would seem to be the first instance of a national register collecting
ownership information on foreign companies rather than domestic ones.
One might also recall the qualification statutes that US states have long
deployed to condition the ability of foreign corporations incorporated in
other states to do business or appear in court. 77 Nor are such types of
measures necessarily limited to Western jurisdictions. 78 The question,
admittedly, is whether sufficient consensus can be found, within the EU for
example, on the typology of companies subject to additional transparency
obligations and concurrent limitations on rights (the objective of such
173. EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM0208) (2016) at proposed new paragraph 10a.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176.

DEPARTMENT

FOR

BUSINESS,

ENERGY

AND INDUSTRIAL

STRATEGY,

A

REGISTER

OF

BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF OVERSEAS COMPANIES AND OTHER LEGAL ENTITIES: RESPONSE TO

FOR EVIDENCE 9 (Mar. 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/681844/
CALL

ROEBOGov Response to Call for Evidence.pdf.

177. On the type of protections that have been deployed in the past by incorporation theory
countries, see Drury, supra note 72, at 178.
178. In Russia, for example, the highest commercial court decided in 2013 on its own authority
to restrict the procedural rights of a Dominican company owning real estate property on
grounds of its failure to disclose its beneficial owners. Postanovleniye Prezidiuma Vysshego

Arbitrazhnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsiiot 26 marta 2013. No. 14828/12 [Resolution Presidium
of the Supreme Arbitration Court Russian Federation March 26, 2013 No. 14828/12], VYSSHIY
ARBITRAZHNYY St D ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII [Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian

Federation] 2013, p. 7 8.
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measures being to target shell companies but not all foreign corporations),
or on the categories of activities that should be subject to control. Statutory
limitations on real estate ownership rights and rights to open bank accounts
by foreign shell companies, however, would probably appear to be fairly
consensual.179
C.

SETTING ASIDE THE INCORPORATION LAW FOR CORPORATE
VEIL PIERCING AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY
Another proposition is to ensure protection available ex post facto by

curtailing the empire of the incorporation law in two specific types of
proceedings: corporate veil piercing cases (or national equivalents), and
director liability. These proceedings may involve not only corporate law but
other categories of law as well, which will often be tort law, contract law,
insolvency law and sometimes even criminal law. Despite the direction
taken by private international law, 180 when the question arises whether to
pierce the veil of a foreign corporation or engage the liability of a director or
controlling person, the rules of the jurisdiction of incorporation should not
be determinative, and the forum law should prevail whenever the objective is
to protect counterparties or creditors outside the jurisdiction of
incorporation. This solution may seem unorthodox at first glance or likely
to open Pandora's box unpredictability in cross-border situations, but it is
arguably already compatible with accepted law in many jurisdictions,
precisely because veil piercing will often involve categories like tort, contract

or agency. Despite or perhaps because of the high threshold of veil piercing
in the English system, a number of English scholars have already argued in
favor of this type of versatility. Authors have defended the right to set aside
incorporation law specifically on grounds of diversity of connecting
factors,i 8i or pointed out that English law must remain relevant whenever a
foreign company is a "sham" or "pretend" company. 82 In this last case, even
179. Following increased AML pressure, many international banks have been closing down
accounts of offshore entities for several years already. See, e.g., Dimitri Sevastopulo, British
Virgin Islands Suffers Amid Push Against Anti-Money Laundering, FINANCIAL TIViES (Sept. 16,
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/3fbed922- 3d5 - lle4-87ld-00144feabdcO.
180. See Gelter, supra note 120, at 333-35 (highlighting one of the main outcomes of the
Centros line of decisions: the ECJ has implicitly been nudging member states towards creditor
protection in a non-paternalistic manner ex post rather than ex ante, through mechanisms like
corporate veil piercing that are very fact intensive and individualized in approach).
181. Chee Ho Tham, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: Searching ForAppropriate Choice Of Law Rules,
22 LLOYD'S MAR. AND COM. L. Q. 42 (2007) ("without appreciating the varied nature of the
veil piercing exercise, one might be tempted to look only at the lex incorporationisto answer the
question, because veil piercing might well be characterized as an issue particularly related to the
nature of the corporation and its relationship with its members. But this approach need not be
applied indiscriminately. The lex incorporationis, though important, need not always be the
proper law." The author concludes that "on the current state of English domestic law, it may
well be that there is no room for a single choice of law rule to govern the issue of corporate veil
piercing.").
182. Briggs, supra note 6, T 10.28 (the difficulty, however, is that English characterization as a
sham is often difficult to achieve in practice).
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"if it were shown that foreign law was applicable and for example absolutely
declined to permit the personality of the corporation to be looked behind, as
some jurisdictions may, the common law rules of private international law
would be entitled to disapply the foreign law on ground of public policy."183
In the United States, while many states apply the internal affairs doctrine in
corporate veil piercing cases, it is not a universal rule and some states
proceed otherwise: "New York is a leading example of a state that does not
apply the internal affairs doctrine to veil piercing. Instead, New York relies
on a choice of law rule known as the "paramount interest" test, under which
"the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation will
be applied ... and the facts or contacts which obtain significance are those
which relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict."184
In EU jurisdictions, disenfranchisement of the foreign incorporation law
can presumably be achieved by unlimited application or expansion of
national veil piercing doctrines to all types of non-EU companies even under
the auspices of corporate law proceedings. When shell companies are
registered in the EU, the question becomes that of the standards that would
allow overcoming the test of the Centros jurisprudence in individual
corporate law cases. This may end up requiring thresholds such as fraud or
overriding mandatory rules, which are very high and risk locking the
European system into incorporation law unilateralism.185 The solution may
therefore lie in wider cross-border use of insolvency or tort related creditor
protection rules, e.g. falling under COMI or connecting factors other than
place of incorporation. This could in fact be the direction taken in the
CJEU's 2015 Kornhaas decision, which allowed the application of German
fiduciary liability rules to the British director of a UK LLC.186 Seen from a
certain angle, this all seems like a necessary flight away from corporate law
towards other disciplines such as insolvency or tort, regarding matters which
should be at the heart of corporate law. In other words, it is quite an
indictment of corporate law for its failure to craft its own indigenous
solutions to protect interests other than those of shareholders. Rejection of
shareholder primacy is often expressed in critical corporate law scholarship
on contemporary standards of corporate governance; as it turns out, the
same exact reproach can also be formulated against the contemporary private
international law of companies.
183. Id. T 10.27.

184.

BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra

note 32, at 135.

185. For a French defense of the active deployment of 'fraud' against the use of shell
companies, see Sophie Schiller, Lafraude, necessaire "deus ex machina face a levolution du droit des
socetes, 4

REVUE DES SOCLETES

211 (2014).

186. Case C-594/14, Kornhaas v. Dithmar, 2015 ECL: EU 806 (Dec. 10, 2015). For a critique
of the Kornhaas decision, see Wolf Georg Ringe, Kornhaas and the Limits of Corporate
Establishment, OXFORD

UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW

BLOG 2016 (May 25, 2016), https://

www.law.ox.ac.uklbusiness-law-blog/blog/201 6/05/kornhaas-and-limits-corporate-establish
ment. According to Ringe, the court appeared to be in a "state of mental blackout."
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INTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL "SoVF-LAw" BEST STANDARDS
OF CORPORATE LAW

Veil piercing is highly specific to national traditions, and it is not realistic
to imagine that entire sections of domestic private law involved in the
exercise will soon be harmonized (although there may be convergence on
some elements). If there is sufficient international consensus on the risks
posed by foreign shell companies, it might be possible, however, to devise
functional "best standards" of substantive corporate law, which could

encourage gradual convergence during law reform and be used by national
courts when considering cross-border veil piercing or director liability cases.
This might be particularly useful in emerging market economies, which tend
to be more exposed to the use of foreign shell companies but where courts
may be less experienced in such matters. The standards would involve
identifying the more harmful characteristics of shell companies involved in
contentious proceedings, in particular the corporate anonymity,
deconstruction of corporate organs and evisceration of fiduciary duties that
have been described above. The task of compiling these best standards
could be entrusted to international policy forming bodies like the FATF and
OECD, which have already taken the lead in global soft law efforts against
money laundering and tax evasion. Generally, the objectives of such
standards should be to encourage corporate transparency, reverse the
deconstruction of corporate administration, reduce the length of opaque
supply chains of incorporation services, and preserve the active supervisory
function of directors. Such standards, if implemented in jurisdictions of
incorporation, would augment the volume of information on corporate
activity that is actually known to local service providers, through the threat
of real liability being imposed on them by creditors or domestic regulators.
This may of course increase the cost of incorporation services as a national
export, but it would also preserve the current model and allow these
jurisdictions to continue this line of activity.
VI.

Conclusion

This article is based on the premise that the proliferation of shell
companies is a problematic feature of the international economic order. It
has argued that contrary to public law disciplines, their private law treatment
remains too deferential to legal form in the place of incorporation. There
are a number of singular factors explaining this evolution over recent
decades. Amongst these factors are the geographical spread of the English
common law tradition, the decline of the real seat theory in Europe, the rise

of contractarian theories of the firm and the emergence of post-communist
economies naturally deferent to legal form. The enduring fragmentation of
corporate law along national lines and increased deference to laws of
incorporation have led to a competitive global market for incorporation
services and, it is argued here, erosion of substantive standards of corporate
law. In addition to regulatory measures that are currently being
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implemented to curb some of the more harmful effects of the misuse of
corporate personality, this article has argued that attention also needs to be
paid to the private law dimension. Deference to the law of incorporation of
shell companies should be reduced, further harmonization of private
international law to entrench the incorporation theory in the European
context should be resisted, and private law measures should be considered at
a national level that would impose substantive conditions prior to foreign
corporations reaping the full benefits of corporate personality and limited
liability, particularly when the fiduciary obligation of the corporate organs
has been reduced or eliminated. Statutory limitations of rights and
corporate veil piercing would be primary arenas for such types of measures.
In addition, one could imagine the development of soft law
recommendations by international standard setting bodies to encourage an
international race to the top rather than to the bottom.
As a penultimate comment, it is accepted that all this may look like a
sweeping defense of national diversity and differences, leading to greater
uncertainty in cross-border situations and higher transaction costs. The
response to this objection is that the time when predictability and
transaction cost reduction were paramount goals overriding everything else,
including historical legacies of institutional "bio-diversity," may now be
over. Private law institutional "bio-diversity" can be viewed in a positive
light. The continental European principles of corporate law that developed
over time and were exemplified by the real seat theory had internal logic and
political legitimacy. National private laws remain the bedrock on which
most citizens and economic actors make decisions and structure transactions;
as diversity and competition between national private laws evidently
continue to exist, then it would be entirely natural that the same diversity
should extend to private international law, and that national systems be
afforded dedicated private law tools to deal with what might appear to them
as foreign institutional anomalies. If points of international agreement are
nevertheless possible, for example on the importance of preserving full
fiduciary obligation on corporate organs, non-binding cooperative efforts in
the form of soft law best standards of corporate law would help to give a
general sense of direction for the benefit of all.
As a final comment, this article has also sought to show how an
accumulation of singular private law processes in different jurisdictions led
to an arguably unsatisfactory general outcome. Private international law was
the main discipline contributing to this outcome, in its role as international
conveyor belt transporting discrete national legal institutions across borders
with perhaps insufficient attention being paid to the content of institutions,
the values embedded into them or their compatibility with circumstances
elsewhere. Yet within this discipline there may also be untapped tools to
achieve coordinated diversity, which should accordingly warrant attention by
scholars.
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